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Thread: Wikileaks American Cables on Ireland.

  1. #31
    Kev Bar Guest

    Default Re: Wikileaks American Cables on Ireland.

    Quote Originally Posted by Seán Ryan View Post
    You're speaking of the Holy Grail Kev. There are so many folks that I know would love to get the details of McEvaddy's deals it's quite astonishing, considering that he's pretty much unknown as far as the general public are concerned. Get the dirt on him and lots of folks will need more than a shower. I've been looking and waiting myself for quite some time.

    I've a feeling that the next batch of documents to be released will contain a lot more Irish stuff. All rumours presently mind you...
    Let's choose our chalice wisely. (Tee Hee)

  2. #32
    Join Date
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    1,174

    Default Re: Wikileaks American Cables on Ireland.

    Ciaron O'Reilly of the Pitstop Plowshares/Shannon 5 gave an excellent interview to Radio Adelaide this morning. He spoke of the case and the idea that Ireland should have taken a moral stand against the war and refused to allow Shannon to be used. Interview here:

    http://radioadelaidebreakfast.wordpr.../#comment-2497

  3. #33
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    Default 04dublin1101, northern ireland - irish pm tells special envoy

    Monday, 26 July 2004, 07:22
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 001101
    SIPDIS
    DEPT FOR S/P AND EUR/UBI; NSC FOR VOLKER
    EO 12958 DECL: 07/07/2014
    TAGS EI, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, UK, EUN, NIPP
    SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND - IRISH PM TELLS SPECIAL ENVOY
    REISS THAT IRISH AND BRITS READY FOR ONE FINAL PUSH TO CLOSE A DEAL
    REF: LONDON 4943
    Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES KENNY PER 1.4 (B) AND (D)
    ¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss met on June 30 in Dublin with Irish Prime Minister Ahern and Foreign Minister Brian Cowen to review Irish/British efforts to lay the ground work for another effort at restoring devolved government in NI. Ahern confirmed that he and British PM Blair are prepared to host one last round of “hot house” negotiations with Sinn Fein (SF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the middle of September at a remote site in Scotland on an agreement to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland (NI). If those talks fail, Ahern indicated that a “plan B” (along the lines suggested by the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP)) for standing up NI institutions with a caretaker technocratic government might be worth considering. Subsequently, however, key Irish officials told the Ambassador and DCM that the GOI does not wish to float any notions of a “plan B” in advance of September meetings. Ahern and Cowen both expressed concern that the traditional July-August summer holiday season may keep SF and DUP from adequately preparing for intensive negotiations in early September. Cowen will have staff here in August working on plans. End Summary
    MEETING WITH PM AHERN: THERE ARE DANGERS WITH A PLAN B BUT SDLP PROPOSAL MAY HAVE SOME MERIT
    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    ¶2. (C) Attending with PM Ahern were XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Accompanying Special Envoy Reiss were Ambassador Kenny, S/P Green, and Emboff. Ahern said that there must be a concerted effort in September to get a SF-DUP deal; “we can’t keep going the way we have been.” He agreed with Reiss’ observation that the key ingredients for an agreement are convincing the parties that September is a make-or-break situation, helping SF leader Gerry Adams do a deal, and getting DUP commitments on implementation (of the deal). Also, there must be a credible “plan B” in reserve. Ahern noted that SF now has the political power and position to move forward, “but I don’t know if they will.” Ahern said that he was impressed with the DUP, but its proposed six-month hiatus (between a deal and implementation) is a non-starter because republicans will not accept that long gap; and it brings events too close to UK elections and Blair’s upcoming (1/1/05) responsibilities as G-8 Chairman and EU President.
    ¶3. (C) Reiss agreed that DUP was showing an encouraging willingness to engage, adding that the parties can always negotiate an agreement in principle and a shorter timeframe for implementation, such as three months. The key is implementation because it is unrealistic to expect SF to “pay up front” with no guarantee of a deal. Ahern said the elements of a deal are clear, but it is important to keep all of the other parties involved as well. The last elections virtually eliminated the PUP and the Women’s Coalition; the Alliance Party is significantly weakened; and SDLP and the UUP could lose all their Westminster seats in the next general election (to SF and DUP).
    ¶4. (C) Ahern said SF and the DUP cannot be allowed to hold up the entire devolution process indefinitely. He noted that Blair,s October 2002 &Acts of Completion8 speech in Belfast failed spectacularly to bolster moderate unionism and the DUP continues to gain at UUP’s expense. The question is how to pressure the DUP to deal? Ahern said two points were certain: SF can’t be excluded from a deal, and it must be done within the parameters of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). Without it, nationalist voters will walk away, and the NI public generally will grow more skeptical of devolution. For this reason, of the plan B proposals being circulated, the SDLP,s proposal or some variation &is not a bad one.8 (Note: SDLP recently proposed that the two governments (London and Dublin) nominate 10 administrators for the 10 government departments in order to get some form of devolved government up and running. End note.)
    ¶5. (C) Reiss said the U.S. agreed there are merits to the SDLP,s proposal. Moreover, the threat of a viable plan B might be a useful inducement to get the parties to deal in September. Reiss asked what Dublin and London were doing to prepare the ground for September and offered to send Ahern some thoughts on this soon. Ahern said there were better prospects for success in September if the parties were working off one text that ring-fenced areas of agreement and bracketed the major remaining unresolved issues: fulfilling commitments under the Joint Declaration, the Finucane inquiry, On The Runs (OTRs), and release of the murderers of Garda Gerry McCabe. Reiss asked whether the Finucane case was a potential deal breaker. Ahern said it is not a republican, but a nationalist, issue. Because there is such broad-based support across the nationalist community in the North for an inquiry, SF will insist on it. Ahern added that the results of a Finucane inquiry report tomorrow would not surprise anyone and “Tony (Blair) knows what he has to do.” (Comment: Presumably, that the PM will have to overrule elements of the security-legal establishments to see that some form of public inquiry is held. End comment.)
    ¶6. (C) Taioseach advisor XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SF knows there can be no deal without decommissioning - “everyone knows what needs to be done.” Ahern added that another secret decommissioning act will not work; SF must understand that without transparency it will get no credit from DUP leader Paisley. Ahern noted that a clergyman in contact with Adams XXXXXXXXXXXX might act as a witness. His participation might be seen by unionists as lending credibility. Ahern said that the way to get SF on the policing boards is a deal that devolves policing/justice relatively quickly in exchange for an end to paramilitary activity and complete decommissioning. But, he added, DUP does not yet understand this. Reiss said that he would reinforce this when he met with DUP leaders on July 28.
    MEETING WITH FM COWEN: GOI READY FOR FULL COURT PRESS IN SEPTEMBER
    ------------------------------------
    ¶7. (C) Reiss subsequently met with Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen, who was accompanied by XXXXXXXXXXXX. Cowen said that, even though DUP leader Paisley wants to do a deal, the main worry going into the September talks is that the parties will delay an agreement to get a better deal: “this is why we discuss plan Bs.” Cowen added that, nonetheless, the GOI is going into September “with all guns blazing.” Reiss asked what will the market bear in terms of pain to the parties. That is, he suggested that the parties discuss a plan B publicly and privately to pressure both the DUP and SF. Reiss added that SF-DUP dialogue over the next two months approaching September is critical and asked whether a &stick and carrot8 approach to Sinn Fein (SF) might be adopted and result in forward motion. XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that it is difficult to find a stick that won’t alienate SF and destabilize/set back the entire process. Cowen reiterated PM Ahern’s endorsement that talks in September focus around a bracketed text.
    ¶8. (C) Cowen said that the key factor at present is the DUP willingness to pre-cook a deal. This should allow SF to seriously engage, get an agreement, and then proceed with sequencing. In terms of offering a carrot, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the DUP needs to feel &flattered.8 He noted that party members are visiting the Kennedy School of Government in Harvard during the month of July, and it may be opportune to invite them to Washington for consultations and to drive home the message that the opportunity for a deal is there. Cowen said that the DUP must understand that changes on Strand One of the GFA would need to be offset by changes to Strand Two. He added that the issue of First Minister and Deputy First Minister must be resolved sooner rather than later. On decommissioning, Cowen suggested that one way to get transparency without breaching confidentiality would be to publish retrospectively the index listing a full inventory of guns and explosives following total decommissioning.
    ¶9. (C) Reiss asked how firm was the DUP’s demand for a six-month &decontamination8 period prior to SF taking seats at the Executive table. Cowen replied that 6 months is a negotiating position, and “in fairness” DUP is ready to do a “big bang” deal now. Cowen noted that the devolution of justice is a critical issue for SF, and Finucane is a potential deal breaker -- it is a &hot button topic8 that is not going to go away. KENNY

  4. #34
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    Default 08dublin556, the bank guarantee: An irish solution to an irish

    Vzczcxro2027
    pp ruehfl ruehkw ruehla ruehrov ruehsr
    de ruehdl #0556/01 2831021
    zny ccccc zzh
    p 091021z oct 08
    fm amembassy dublin
    to ruehc/secstate washdc priority 9491
    info ruehzl/european political collective priority
    ruehbl/amconsul belfast priority 0806

    thursday, 09 october 2008, 10:21
    c o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 02 dublin 000556
    sipdis
    eo 12958 decl: 10/09/2018
    tags efin, econ, prel, pgov, ei
    subject: The bank guarantee: An irish solution to an irish
    problem
    dublin 00000556 001.2 of 002
    classified by: Pol/econ chief theodore s. Pierce. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
    â¶1. (c) summary: On september 29, the irish government announced plans to back deposits in all irish-domiciled banks. Foreign banks with significant irish operations were initially left out of the scheme but some look now to be included. Irish government officials maintain that impaired assets at irish banks are still relatively insignificant and are mostly confined to commercial property loans. They say that regulatory oversight of the financial sector will be tightened and that the drying up of credit to irish banks forced the decision to guarantee all deposits. The crush on irish banks could not have come at a worse time -- immediately preceding next week’s presentation of what is widely expected as the most austere government budget in years. End summary.
    A crisis unfolds
    ----------------
    â¶2. (u) following a late-night september 29 meeting with leading bankers -- central bank governor john hurley and chief executive of the financial regulator pat neary -- prime minister brian cowen took the decision to guarantee the deposits, loans, and obligations of the six irish-owned banks for two years. The next day finance minister brian lenihan and hurley briefed their key european counterparts. During a marathon session (almost 22 hours, a record) on october 1, the irish parliament passed legislation that would make the guarantee operational. On october 2, president mary mcaleese signed the credit institutions (financial support) bill 2008 into law. On october 6, lenihan faced questions about the scheme from other eu finance minister at an ecofin meeting in brussels and the central bank and the regulatory authority met to finalize the terms of the plan. On october 8, the irish cabinet met to discuss the plan but delayed announcing anything until the eu gives its formal approval, which is widely expected to happen early next week.
    A perfect storm
    ---------------
    â¶3. (c) econoff and visiting eur/we desk officer met with central bank and financial services authority officials gordon barham, maria woods, and billy clarke on october 6 to talk about the government’s bank guarantee plan. Clarke said that the regulator had been carefully watching the banking sector as the months-long credit contraction unfolded. Explaining the seemingly sudden pressure on irish banks last week, he said a “perfect storm” of external events related to the credit crisis had dried up the traditional sources of financing for irish financial institutions. Barham maintained that the level of impaired assets in the system stood at between 0.5 and 0.8 percent and these are mostly confined to loans to commercial property developers. When pressed, barham said the media had exaggerated the level of problem assets and those that existed could be managed.
    â¶4. (c) clarke hesitated to make predictions but said that it is “likely” the regulatory system would move from one that relied heavily on bank management working within broad guidelines laid down by the regulator to a “rules-based” one. An example he gave was that the regulator may be given the authority to limit the percentage of the banks’ loan books that are extended to any one sector (i.e. Commercial or residential property). Barham and clarke said that the banks would not be allowed to securitize and sell impaired assets under this scheme. Rather, the banks, the regulator, and other government agencies would have to figure out how to “unwind the problem assets without exposing the irish taxpayer to undue risk.”
    â¶5. (c) econoff spoke with kevin cardiff, second secretary general at the department of finance, who has been deeply involved in putting together the guarantee package. Cardiff echoed the regulator and pointed out that auditors contracted by his department to look at the books of at least two of the institutions under pressure came away with “a favorable impression of the loan books.” while he admitted that the amount of “speculative loans, or those that are not currently productive, is not insignificant,” he stressed that all involved in putting together the package were confident that the government would not be forced to bail out the banks.
    â¶6. (c) cardiff said that credit to the irish banks “virtually dried up” on september 29 and that the government had to step in to salvage the irish financial sector. The genesis of this was classic “herd mentality” based mostly on rumor and innuendo about irish banks rather than any hard facts. However, fighting the herd became impossible, he added. He added that non-irish institutions with significant irish
    dublin 00000556 002.2 of 002
    operationsxxxxxxxxxxxx would likely be included in the scheme. Xxxxxxxxxxxx
    â¶7. (c) although the move did not win any friends across europe, cardiff said that there is a gradual realization in brussels that each country should be allowed to tailor its response to local conditions. He characterized the irish government’s discussion with eu officials as “positive” and indicated that the irish solution would soon gain approval. In an aside, he pointed out that irish finance minister brian lenihan and his british counterpart, alistair darling, had engaged in a very constructive exchange of views. Cardiff continued that the prevailing mood in europe is that “large-scale failures just make things worse” and that he expected more irish-like solutions. He warned, though, that the battle had just begun.
    Comment
    -------
    â¶8. (c) against the background of a steep slump in the property market and anecdotal evidence we have picked up, it may be that government officials are being a bit optimistic in their assessment of the level of impaired assets. It begs the question: If the level of impaired assets is not a problem, why the sudden pressure on irish banks? Perhaps the perfect storm answer is the right one. Whatever the answer, the irish government has its work cut out for it as it works with the private sector to stop the bleeding and then rebuild the irish financial sector. With the government maintaining that the irish banking sector nearly collapsed during the past two weeks and the announcement of what is expected to be a very draconian 2009 government budget next week, irish economic policymakers are facing their most significant challenge in decades. Foley

  5. #35
    Join Date
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    Default 05dublin143, peace process: Goi shaken by second ira statement

    Friday, 04 February 2005, 16:06
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000143
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 02/04/2015
    TAGS PREL, PTER, PINR, EI, UK, NIPP
    SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS: GOI SHAKEN BY SECOND IRA STATEMENT
    BUT FAVORS “INCLUSION”
    Classified By: AMB JAMES C. KENNY

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Amb Kenny met February 4 with XXXXXXXXXXXX. The ambassador indicated that the USG is inclined not to invite Northern Ireland political parties to the March 17 White House event. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI believes engagement with Sinn Fein is better than exclusion, and asked if the USG would be willing to defer a decision in case the environment improves. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI strategy regarding the peace process was to “sit tight” and let Sinn Fein find its way back in, following strong messages from the GOI and UK to Sinn Fein leaders. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the second IRA statement made the situation worse. He said the GOI considered the February 3 IRA statement “ominous” and was “unnerved” by it. In response to the ambassador’s request for more information on the bank robbery, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI information came mostly from the UK and from PSNI-Garda contacts, a point reinforced later on February 4 in a telephone conversation from XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the GOI has a “very strong view” that Sinn Fein should not be excluded from the United States, which he wishes to discuss in person with the Ambassador at their XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify on the phone whether he was expressing a general view on visas for Sinn Fein or a specific view on March 17 events.) Separately this week, POL/ECON chief met with political figures active in the peace process, all of whom echoed some of XXXXXXXXXXXX concerns: uncertainty over whether Sinn Fein is serious about peace, whether it can bring the IRA along or would be willing to break from the IRA, and uncertainty over whether Sinn Fein is in full control of the IRA. Interlocutors also commented on the domestic political implications of the current impasse. DCM and POL/ECON Chief also attended the meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary.
    March 17
    --------
    ¶2. (S) On XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ambassador Kenny briefed XXXXXXXXXXXXon current USG thinking about the March 17 events, emphasizing that the most important aspect of the occasion is the President’s meeting with the Taoiseach (PM Ahern). He told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the USG at this point is inclined not to invite any of the Northern Ireland parties to the White House but instead to honor civic leaders. When asked for GOI views, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that it was of course a USG decision to make but it was a decision that would have ramifications in Ireland. He said that the situation is “tense” and the GOI does not want it to worsen. The GOI feels that engagement with Sinn Fein is better than exclusion. Noting that the situation is fluid, he said that the Taoiseach would prefer that no decision be made, yet, on White House participation. XXXXXXXXXXXX seemed especially concerned that no decision be announced next week, given that the week will already be highly charged because of the release of the International Independent Monitoring Commission’s report on the Northern Bank robbery. The discussion then turned to Sinn Fein’s visa requests for events in the U.S. around St. Patrick’s Day, apart from the White House. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated the GOI’s strong view that giving Sinn Fein visas to the U.S. helps the peace process.
    IRA Statements of February 2 and 3
    ----------------------------------
    ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the long IRA statement of February 2 had not worried the GOI because it seemed natural for the IRA to take its decommissioning offer off the table given the abeyance in the peace process. However, he said the February 3 statement had caught them by surprise. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI believed the two statements were written by different drafters. The February 3 statement, he said, looked like the style of the Chief of Staff of the IRA. He called the statement “ominous” and said it had left GOI officials “unnerved and anxious.” He then referred to Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness’ claim of also having no prior knowledge of the statement. He said that if McGuinness genuinely did not know in advance that the IRA would issue a second statement February 3, that could signal that Sinn Fein is genuinely breaking from the IRA. While that might indicate Sinn Fein’s seriousness about pursuing peace, it would raise other issues. Was Sinn Fein losing control over the IRA? If Sinn Fein no longer can or will serve as a conduit to the IRA, who will? XXXXXXXXXXXX then noted that McGuinness did not repudiate the IRA statement, which he implied would tend to indicate no change in Sinn Fein’s relationship with the IRA.
    ¶4. (C) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX uncertainty about Sinn Fein’s intentions and Sinn Fein’s control over the IRA were echoed in comments across the political spectrum this week, including in conversations with Senator Martin Mansergh, former government advisor on Northern Ireland; staff from the Glencree Center for reconciliation; and a Fianna Fail political advisor. That XXXXXXXXXXXX and others so long and deeply engaged in the peace process would be so uncertain of Sinn Fein’s intentions is not a good omen for the peace process. It indicates the degree to which the bank robbery destroyed the government’s trust in Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, uncertainty about Sinn Fein’s interest in peace or control over the IRA, combined with the IRA’s February 3 statement, clearly has officials worried. The government steadfastly holds onto engagement with Sinn Fein because it sees no other alternative. End Comment
    Peace Process
    -------------
    ¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the GOI’s approach to the peace process was to “sit tight” and let Sinn Fein find its way back. Equally, the GOI will stay engaged with Sinn Fein, including a February 4 meeting between FM Dermott Ahern and Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that until the bank robbery, there was every expectation that a comprehensive agreement would be reached. He said the two outstanding issues, decommissioning and criminality, had been considered resolvable until the bank robbery -- which he termed a “tragedy that stopped everything.” Senator Martin Mansergh, who remains influential in the peace process and close to the Taoiseach, was more expansive. He said that Sinn Fein must get the message to draw a line under paramilitarism and criminality. Echoing what we have also heard from DFA, Mansergh said that since the robbery, there is no longer any willingness to accept Sinn Fein’s argument that it needs time to bring the IRA along. Like other contacts, Mansergh said that ten years is long enough and this time, all around talks can only begin on the basis of the IRA winding up. Neither Mansergh nor any government official has yet defined what they would need from Sinn Fein. They say that they will not again work on a comprehensive package only to have it fall apart at the end because of the IRA yet also say they would not expect decommissioning and a cessation of criminality to be a pre-requisite to all party talks.
    GOI Information on the Northern Bank Robbery
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the GOI’s judgment on the robbery was based almost exclusively on UK intelligence. He also said that intelligence is handled very differently in the British and Irish governments. In the Irish government, many officials, including himself, do not receive any intelligence reports. The tradition instead is to take the word of the Garda. Later on February 4, at XXXXXXXXXXXX’ request, XXXXXXXXXXXX called the ambassador. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he would be more precise with the Ambassador during their scheduled February 8 meeting, but confirmed that UK and PSNI information, combined with Ireland’s long experience with the IRA, was the basis for the GOI assessment that IRA was behind the robbery. He said the GOI has no smoking gun or hard evidence but that the GOI considered it 99% certain that IRA conducted the robbery. Among several reasons, he said that no group other than IRA could have entered the neighborhood in which the bank manager lived. He described it as a “no go” area for the PSNI and splinter groups. He also said no other group would have the discipline, this many weeks after the robbery, not to try to use a bank note, or provide information on the van or any other aspect of the robbery. He said that the GOI does have “rock solid evidence” that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness are members of the IRA military command and for that reason, the Taoiseach is certain they would have known in advance of the robbery.
    Domestic Implications
    ---------------------
    ¶7. (C) The GOI’s all-out verbal offensive against Sinn Fein has tongues wagging about domestic politics. Martin Mansergh volunteered that as much as the Taoiseach is thinking about the 2007 elections, he values the peace process more and would sacrifice political gain if he thought peace would be advanced. Mansergh told POL/ECON chief that the bank robbery has damaged Sinn Fein in the Republic. While not yet reflected in poll numbers, Mansergh and other political operatives, believe (or hope) that some Sinn Fein voters will go elsewhere now that it is clear that Sinn Fein can not become part of any government in the Republic as long as IRA activity continues. On radio, Mansergh made the point more colorfully: “The truth is that Sinn Fein, regardless of extra seats they might or mightn’t win, wouldn’t come within an asses’ roar of power north or south of the Border until the IRA is off the pitch.” 8. (C) Another idea sporadically under consideration is that Fianna Fail could start competing in elections in Northern Ireland. The argument is that Fianna Fail’s best way of confronting Sinn Fein in the Republic is to become an all-island party. Some think doing so could also give nationalists in the north an alternative to Sinn Fein, given the SDLP’s waning fortunes. Mansergh did not see this as a short term prospect, in part because the SDLP has not yet indicated an interest in merging with Fianna Fail. Derek Mooney, Fianna Fail’s political advisor to the Defense Minister, says the opposite. He said the bank robbery is rapidly changing the prospective and it is the right time for Fianna Fail to move north. He noted that most of SDLP’s former voters are not voting at all, and only a small percentage shifted to Sinn Fein. This, he said, leaves space for a nationalist party with a vision for the future, a space Mooney thinks SDLP will never re-gain because it is seen only as a peace process party. Mooney said Fianna Fail took a significant step in November 2004 when it changed its rules, allowing full membership for people not resident in the Republic. The rules also allow a person to be a member of both Fianna Fail and SDLP. Mooney provides campaign advice to SDLP. KENNY

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    Default 05dublin286, ireland: Finance minister cowen on the north,

    Tuesday, 08 March 2005, 14:11
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000286
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
    TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, SOCI
    SUBJECT: IRELAND: FINANCE MINISTER COWEN ON THE NORTH,
    MONEY LAUNDERING, AND HIGHER EDUCATION
    REF: DUBLIN 210
    Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
    ¶1. (C) Summary. In a brief March 7 meeting with Finance Minister Brian Cowen, the Ambassador recommended U.S.-style tax incentives for university endowment contributions as a model for Ireland in addressing funding shortfalls for higher education. Cowen noted Ireland’s drive on economic and academic competitiveness and said that the GOI could consider the endowment idea as part of ongoing comprehensive review of the Irish tax code. On Northern Ireland, Cowen said that a strong message from the U.S. Congress to Sinn Fein could help to advance a final resolution in the peace proces, as would Congressional hearings on criminality. Cowen also noted that Sinn Fein seems to be playing a “double game” -- taking a hard public line against criminality, but avoiding definitive action in order to retain maneuverability for final negotiations with unionists. The Minister also pointed out that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was taking the GOI lead on investigations into the apparent money-laundering scheme uncovered on February 17-18, and he offered to arrange a DOJ briefing for the Embassy on the status of the investigations. End summary.
    ¶2. (U) On March 7, the Ambassador held a brief, cordial meeting with Finance Minister Brian Cowen.XXXXXXXXXXXX also attended, along with XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Econoff was Embassy notetaker.
    Higher Education Funding
    ------------------------
    ¶3. (C) The Ambassador related concerns expressed by U.S. firms and Irish universities that the quality and number of third-level graduates (roughly 16,000 in 2004) increasingly appeared insufficient to meet the needs of Ireland’s hi-tech economic sectors. The Ambassador noted that this problem had repercussions for Ireland’s drive on global competitiveness and was linked to limits on education funding, which derived from the Government’s long-standing decision not to impose university tuition for Irish students (a theme of the Ambassador’s March 3 speech at Trinity College). He cited the case of E-Bay, which had established offices in Ireland in 2004, but which was now several hundred employees behind in its hiring schedule because of qualification deficiencies among job applicants. With the reimposition of tuition fees off the table, said the Ambassador, an alternative funding mechanism for Irish higher education could be U.S.-style university endowments. Importantly, U.S. tax law encouraged individual and corporate donations to an endowment by making them tax-deductible. The Ambassador asked whether the U.S. endowment model might hold interest for the Department of Finance and also whether private contributions to university endowments were now, or could become, tax-deductible.
    ¶4. (SBU) Cowen thanked the Ambassador for his interest and cited the Government’s focus on competition, both at the university level and for the Irish economy writ-large. Cowen said that, in the Government’s drive to improve university education, the Department of Finance had concentrated on assisting the transition to better management structures in university administration. This effort entailed rationalizing curricula, faculty, and academic departments so as to eliminate obscure, under-attended courses with a view to making the most good for the most students. The extra motivation for the Finance Department’s efforts with the universities had come primarily from an OECD report in 2004 on Irish higher education, which claimed that Ireland was risking its global economic competitiveness without more extensive education reforms. He added that whereas endowments had not previously played a major role in education funding in Ireland, this was an idea that the Government might do well to consider, especially with the unlikely reimposition of tuition fees.
    ¶5. (C) Cowen confirmed that private/corporate donations to education endowments were currently not tax-deductible, a reflection of the fact that corporate and personal tax rates were already comparatively low. He added, however, that the Finance Department was conducting a comprehensive review of breaks/incentives in the Irish tax code and that endowment contributions could be examined in that context. To introduce tax write-offs for endowment donations, it would be necessary, said Cowen, to ensure that funds otherwise destined for government coffers would not simply be switched to the endowments. Second, the tax incentives for contributions would have to be designed to discourage contributors from dictating to the universities the way that their donations could be used, e.g., only for cancer research. Cowen observed that failure on this second point could allow contributors too powerful a voice in the design of student curricula. He noted that, with the surge in the number of wealthy Irish, there could be win-win situations for the universities in terms of funding resources and for contributors in terms of their tax burden. He said the Finance Department would welcome any additional U.S. perspectives on the endowment idea that the Ambassador might wish to offer.
    Northern Ireland; Money Laundering
    ----------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) On the Northern Ireland peace process, Cowen expected that Sinn Fein would “go off to sort itself out” following the party’s annual conference on March 4-6 in Dublin. He believed that, after the May Westminster elections, Sinn Fein would attempt to convince people of its seriousness about criminality through actions designed to back up the party’s recent positive rhetoric on the subject. Cowen related his impression that Gerry Adams was playing a “double game” -- taking a hard public line against criminality, but avoiding definitive action in order to retain maneuverability for final negotiations with unionists. Cowen thought the family of murder victim Robert McCartney had done a valuable public service in exposing this form of equivocation. The Minister also expressed hope that the U.S. Congress would deliver a strong message to Sinn Fein over St. Patrick’s Day on the need for a final resolution in Northern Ireland, especially with the IRA cease-fire now more than ten years old. A series of Congressional hearings on Northern Ireland focusing on the criminality question would, maintained Cowen, help to bring political pressure on Sinn Fein to take the necessary steps in pursuit of a final deal.
    ¶7. (C) When the Ambassador asked for an update on the GOI money-laundering investigation into the February 17-18 police seizures of roughly euro 4 million in sterling notes (reftel), Minster Cowen replied that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was the GOI lead on the case. He said, however, that the Department of Finance was as intensely interested in GOI progress as the Embassy, and he offered to arrange a DOJ confidential briefing for the Embassy on the investigations. Cowen noted that the briefing could include a supplement from the Ireland Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA, a component of the Irish Central Bank). He added that IFSRA had not reported any problems to date in pursuing the case in the context of its relatively new regulatory powers under the “Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act, 2003.”
    KENNY

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    Default 04dublin1719, secretary snow,s discussions with the architects

    123
    ¶1. (C) Summary: The November 14-15 visit of U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow was an opportunity for discussion on
    SIPDIS the “secrets” of Ireland,s success with policy-makers and businessmen who were the architects of Ireland,s Celtic Tiger economy. These key figures noted that while the concepts behind Ireland,s reforms had been simple, the political will to carry out the reforms had only come in the context of an economic meltdown in the mid-1980s. They said that good-faith relations with labor, investment in education, and a “dictatorial” leadership that exposed industries to the full discipline of the market had been key to success. Ireland,s skill in securing substantial EU support funds and in exploiting U.S. policy on corporate tax deferral was another important factor in Ireland,s economic turnaround. Looking ahead, the policy-makers cited both the need to ensure Ireland,s continued competitiveness as a magnet for foreign direct investment and also the role of education in shaping Ireland as an innovation-based, higher-value economy. Secretary Snow,s classroom discussion at Dublin City University (DCU) highlighted the role of higher education in promoting innovation and entrepreneurship. End summary.
    ------------
    Introduction
    ------------
    ¶2. (U) The November 14-15 visit of U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow was an opportunity for substantive discussion on the “secrets” of Ireland,s economic success. During a dinner hosted by the Ambassador and a lunch arranged by the Ulster Bank, Secretary Snow spoke with 16 policy-makers and businessmen (listed in para 12) who were instrumental in the emergence of the Celtic Tiger economy. A breakfast with the American Chamber of Commerce and a classroom exchange at Dublin City University (DCU) reinforced the points made by these key figures. The following are the principal insights that emerged from Secretary Snow,s visit (which are organized thematically, not in the sequential order in which they were discussed).
    --------------------------------------------- --------
    In the Beginning: Political Will and Industrial Peace
    --------------------------------------------- --------
    ¶3. (C) Although the concepts behind Ireland,s reforms had been simple, the political will to carry out the reforms had only come in the context of the mid-1980s, economic meltdown, said Padraig O,hUiginn, former Secretary General in the Office of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). O,hUiginn recalled drafting a proposal for economic recovery during that era, using ideas that were “apparent to any first-year economics graduate student” ) cut the fiscal deficit, spur competition, lower corporate taxes, etc. The ruling party at the time, Fine Gael, did not act on the proposal, but the Fianna Fail government elected in 1987 made the document the basis for the Program of National Recovery (PNR), which set forth the policies that underpinned Ireland,s economic turnaround. Fianna Fail,s “great advantage” at the time, said O,hUiginn, was Ireland,s economic crisis; with 18 percent unemployment and government debt at 130 percent of GDP, the political opposition, industry, and labor could not afford politically to impede solutions. The PNR,s linchpin was labor,s decision to accept a moderate wage increases in exchange for income tax relief, which became the basic approach to successive national wage-setting (Social Partnership) agreements. O,hUiginn recounted that the Government offered Irish pounds 700 million in tax relief in 1987 and also cut the fiscal deficit, forcing the closure of several hospitals and the retrenchment of 16,000 civil servants. He noted that the moderate wage increase incorporated in the PNR laid the foundation for Ireland,s competitiveness as an export platform and as a draw for foreign direct investment (FDI).
    ¶4. (C) The Government,s good-faith dealings with unions in negotiating Social Partnership agreements were, and remained, central to Ireland,s economic success, said Peter Cassells, former General Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. According to Cassells, a shared understanding between unions and the Government on the importance of decent wages and housing for workers was the basis of labor,s commitment to the Social Partnership approach. He added that the transparency and inclusiveness of wage-setting negotiations, in which even the most disgruntled union representatives were given voice, were also instrumental to success. The typical industrial relations model in which union chiefs and politicians hammered out back-room agreements, in the mode of Lyndon Johnson and Lane Kirkland, would not have secured labor buy-in to economic reforms, Cassells asserted. He further observed that the Social Partnership approach might not be replicable in other EU Member States, which typically were more populous than Ireland and had more diffuse union structures.
    ----------------------
    The Key: Human Capital
    ----------------------
    ¶5. (C) The chief source of Ireland,s success has been its educated labor force, said EU Commissioner-designate and former Irish Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy. He noted that the introduction of free primary and secondary education in the 1960-70s initially benefited other countries as much as Ireland, due to the emigration of educated Irish workers. As a young parliamentarian, moreover, McCreevy had warned that the 1970s, baby boom was a looming disaster, on the pretext that Ireland,s small, weak economy could not accommodate a future surge in labor, even with emigration. As it turned out, this large pool of young, educated workers became Ireland,s principal resource and the main attraction for foreign multinationals to establish subsidiaries in the country. Far from a disaster, the period 1987-2003 saw the addition of 600,000 jobs to the economy and drop in the unemployment rate from 18 percent to 4 percent. This success, concluded McCreevy, was primarily attributable to Ireland,s investment in human capital.
    ------------------------
    “Dictatorial” Leadership
    ------------------------
    ¶6. (C) The implementation of reforms that underpinned Ireland,s economic recovery had required “dictatorial” leadership, said McCreevy. This involved incenitivizing industries to achieve efficiencies by exposing them to the full discipline of the market, even at the risk of bankruptcies. The challenge in this approach, explained McCreevy, was to press ahead with reforms in the face of elections, which provided temptations for politicians to adopt softer, more populist economic platforms. Secretary Snow observed that whereas the gains from economic reforms in any country tended to be diffuse, the losses were often concentrated in particular sectors or geographic areas, making it easier for those affected to organize political opposition. McCreevy commented that the test of any government was how well it explained to dislocated workers that the reforms responsible for their plight were good for the country. Indecon Economic Consultants CEO Alan Gray separately pointed out that Ireland had succeeded, through education, in giving workers the skills to move across industries, to the point now where those laid off did not ask, “Do I have any hope of a job?” but rather “Which one of my new employment choices should I take?”
    -------
    EU Help
    -------
    ¶7. (C) EU tools, primarily structural support funds, were another factor in the emergence of Ireland,s Celtic Tiger economy, explained former Prime Minister (1992-95) Albert Reynolds and Ray McSharry, former EU Commissioner and Irish Finance Minister. Reynolds said that the Irish Government did not shy from viewing such tools as entitlements, since Ireland, as an island nation, faced additional challenges trading within the European Community. He and McSharry recalled that Ireland had negotiated well to maximize the level of EU support. For example, Reynolds claimed that he had obtained over euro one billion from Brussels as a result of a discussion with Chancellor Kohl in which Reynolds agreed to support Germany,s push for rapid EU enlargement. EU Commissioner-designate McCreevy separately echoed Reynolds, points, saying that French Finance Minister Sarkozy,s proposal to reduce EU support for new Member States that applied low corporate tax rates was shortsighted. McCreevy said that any EU measures to increase growth in the new Member States would redound to the benefit of the entire EU.
    ---------------------------
    U.S. Policy on Tax Deferral
    ---------------------------
    ¶8. (C) The U.S. policy of tax deferral for foreign subsidiaries of American firms, combined with Ireland,s 12.5 percent corporate tax rate, underpinned the large influx of U.S. investment to Ireland during the Celtic Tiger period, observed Padraic White, former CEO of Ireland,s Industrial Development Authority (IDA). White recounted his numerous trips to the U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee to defend tax deferral, and he argued that Senator Kerry,s plan to reverse tax deferral would have “killed Ireland,” had he been elected. White believed that complaints by the U.S. public about the job outsourcing that accompanied U.S. investment flows were wrong-headed. U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland, he argued, were the principle reason that the United States had penetrated the personal computer, software, and pharmaceutical markets in Europe. He further observed that under-performing U.S. companies were typically those that had not attempted to expand overseas. Secretary Snow concurred that U.S. companies that were outsourcing overseas were those creating the most jobs in the United States. He highlighted, however, the political difficulty of explaining outsourcing to the U.S. public, recalling slogans during the recent election campaign that criticized “Benedict Arnold CEOs.”
    ------------------------------------------
    A Propitious Lack of Monetary Policy Tools
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶9. (C) An ironic feature of Ireland,s success has been the Government,s lack of monetary policy tools, remarked Cormack McCarthy, Chief Executive of the Ulster Bank. One might think that a country that had performed so well in terms of exports and investment would have relied heavily on interest rate and exchange rate levers, said McCarthy. As a euro-zone member, in fact, Ireland had ceded control of its monetary policy to the European Central Bank. The positive result, said McCarthy, were low interest rates. He believed that if Ireland had remained control of monetary policy, the Government would have been tempted to raise interest rates to slow rapid growth in the late 1990s. Instead, the low rates set by the ECB had been a boon to Ireland,s private sector and had lent a sense of stability and consistency to the Irish market for foreign investors.
    --------------------------------------------
    Looking Ahead: Competitiveness and Education
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶10. (C) Looking ahead, the principal danger for Ireland is complacency, said Eoin O,Driscoll, Chairman of Forfas (the Government think-tank) and the Government-commissioned Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG). Echoing the ESG,s recently published findings, O,Driscoll cited the need to ensure Ireland,s continued competitiveness as a magnet for foreign direct investment (FDI), which, he said, had driven the country,s economic transformation. (U.S. and Irish businesspersons who attended the November 15 American Chamber of Commerce breakfast with Secretary Snow made similar points, noting that multinationals were increasingly attracted by low-cost manufacturing opportunities in China and India.) O,Driscoll said that, just as industry and Government had collaborated in the 1990s to make Ireland a base for leading bio-pharmaceutical and IT companies, the country needed a new shared vision to go another rung higher in the production of innovative, high-value goods and services. He note that this challenge would involve marrying innovation to better business practices, particularly in sales and marketing, and he praised the U.S. model of perfecting product designs in the market, as opposed to the European preference of the laboratory. While Secretary Snow cautioned against government attempts to pick winners in the market, he ventured that the key to economic prosperity rested with countries like the United States that fostered a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship.
    ¶11. (U) Secretary Snow,s classroom discussion with students, professors, and administrators at Dublin City University (DCU) was a venue for further discussion on the role of innovation, entrepreneurship, and academia in strengthening the Irish economy. The event took place at DCU,s “Invent Center,” which serves as a business incubator for student entrepreneurs and community start-up companies. Secretary Snow highlighted the centrality of education and
    SIPDIS intellectual capital to the modern, knowledge-based economy, and he explained that to embrace a market economy was to embrace ever-changing needs for new ideas and skills. He also noted the difficulties that economists had encountered in finding ways to capture creativity, “that spark,” in modeling economic activity. DCU president Ferdinand von Prondzynski commented that the university had encountered a similar challenge, but espoused the belief that entrepreneurship could be taught, in the same way as poetry, painting, and other modes of creativity. Prondzynski also stressed that innovation meant little without business skills, and he cited DCU requirements for students to establish relationships Irish entrepreneurs who had both succeeded and failed in bringing new ideas to the market.
    --------------------------------
    Participants in the “Architect” Discussions with Secretary Snow
    -------------------------------
    ¶12. (U) Participants in the Ambassador,s November 14 dinner for Secretary Snow were: Charlie McCreevy, EU Commissioner-designate and former Irish Finance Minister; Dermot Desmond, financier; Eoin O,Driscoll, Chairman of Forfas and the Enterprise Strategy Group; Padraig White, former CEO of the Industrial Development Authority; and Padraig O,huiginn, Former Secretary General in the Office of the Taoiseach. Attendees at the November 15 Ulster Bank lunch were: Ray McSharry, former EU Commisioner and Minister of Finance; Lochlann Quinn, co-founder of Glen Dimplex; Peter Cassells, former Secretary General of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions; Albert Reynolds, former Prime Minister (Taoiseach); Allan Gray, Chairman of Indecon Economic Consulting; Willie Walsh, CEO of Aer Lingus; Bill Harris, National Science Foundation Director; and Cormack McCarthy, David Pierce, and Michael Torpey of the Ulster Bank.
    ¶13. (U) This cable has been cleared by Treasury DAS Nancy Lee KENNY[/quote]

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    Default 05dublin657, northern ireland: Goi waiting for ira response and

    Wednesday, 01 June 2005, 08:39
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUBLIN 000657
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 05/31/2015
    TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINS, EI, UK, NIPP
    SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND
    COMMITTED TO GFA
    REF: LONDON 4254
    Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    Part 1
    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------
    ¶1. (C) During Special Envoy Mitchell Reiss’ visit to Ireland May 19-22, the Irish government emphasized that the Good Friday Agreement and the December 8 joint communique must be the basis for forward movement in the peace process. They anticipate an IRA response to Gerry Adams’ call to leave the scene within 60 days; they believe the focus must be kept on the IRA but do not have a specific list of steps the IRA must take as pre-conditions to serious negotiations. They believe serious talks will begin in September, but it could take until early 2006 to put the pieces in place, especially since the DUP would require a long period to verify IRA good behavior. GOI officials uniformly expressed concern that the UK’s political interest in showing progress might lead the UK to be too soft on Sinn Fein. Other issues raised include Irish unhappiness with the UK’s inquiry into the Finucane murder; the importance of a non-violent marching season in Northern Ireland; and concerns about IRA criminality. Reiss briefed on his meetings in London and Belfast and informed them of the USG’s decision to refuse a visa to Sinn Fein member Rita O’Hare.
    ¶2. (U) Mitchell Reiss met with the Taoiseach, PM Bertie Ahern; Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, Justice Minister Michael McDowell; Finance Minister Brian Cowen; and, UK Ambassador Eldon. The Ambassador, DCM, POL/ECON Counselor, and S/P Special Assistant accompanied him to all meetings. Reiss and the Ambassador also had a private lunch with President and Dr. McAleese. END SUMMARY
    -------
    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶3. (C) GOI concerns about UK “softness” represent a role reversal. Usually, it is the UK that is concerned Ireland will be too accommodating to Sinn Fein. The GOI’s eventual position will depend on the Taoiseach. He is generally considered “softer” on the provisional movement than either the Foreign Affairs or Justice Ministers. However, he believes Sinn Fein leaders were aware of plans to rob the Northern Bank even as they negotiated with him last Fall. Publicly, he has been unprecedentedly critical of Sinn Fein and, until recently, greatly reduced private contacts as well. We are told that Adams prefers to deal directly with the Taoiseach and not with cabinet ministers. In deciding how to move forward, the Taoiseach is likely to look carefully at the IRA’s response to Gerry Adams, given strong public feelings against IRA crime and paramilitarism. He is expected to call elections in 2007 or sooner. Having a deal in place would serve his political interests best; however, more failed attempts to reach a deal would hurt him electorally, particularly if he were seen to have been played by Sinn Fein. End Comment.
    --------------------------------------------
    TAOISEACH ADVISOR DESCRIBES GOI EXPECTATIONS
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX opened the meeting with an update of GOI actions. He said there had been very little GOI engagement with Sinn Fein since the talks broke down in December. He cited one meeting in January, one in March in Washington, and several private meetings between the Taoiseach and Gerry Adams. Significantly, he said the official feelings toward Sinn Fein had changed with all that has happened since December (Northern Bank robbery, money laundering, McCartney killing.) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI is interested in the Good Friday Agreement and not in any “lesser models or deals.” Following UK elections, the pace was picking up, he said, and he outlined a series of expected contacts with all parties. He said the GOI was pleased at PM Blair’s re-election, and that Sinn Fein is aware that this is Blair’s “last lap.” That, he said, plays both ways. Sinn Fein knows that no successor is likely to be as engaged in the process as Blair, and that he represents their best hope of a deal. On the other hand, Sinn Fein also believes they could take advantage of Blair’s interest in getting a deal before leaving office. Special Envoy Reiss, referring to his talks in London, said it is never good in a negotiation to appear more eager than the other side. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the UK had offered Sinn Fein a package following the December 8 breakdown, but withdrew it after the Northern Bank robbery. (Note: Sinn Fein has frequently expressed anger at the UK for “going back on its word.” While never specifically mentioning a post-December 8 package, during the negotiations, Sinn Fein seemed confident that the UK felt Sinn Fein’s decommissioning offer was worth taking up even if a comprehensive deal with the DUP was not reached.)
    ...KEEP THE FOCUS ON THE IRA
    ¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated the focus must be kept on the IRA. The GOI, he said, hopes for decisive action, followed by a “proving period” and leading to talks that restore the executive. He anticipated that it might take until late fall or early in 2006 to put all the pieces together; the IRA would need to do something definitive within two months, and the DUP would likely require a six-month testing period before agreeing to sit down with Sinn Fein. XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is little appetite within the GOI or the Irish public for going “round and round again.” He said GOI will not go about talks in a “headline way.” The credibility of the process and the players is in question, he said, and this time, talks must work. A deal is possible, he said, but will take time. Reiss responded by saying Gerry Adams had told him to expect an IRA response in a month, before the marching season. Reiss said Adams had stated that “the IRA must be taken out of the equation.” Reiss noted that public tolerance of accepting things at face value is gone. The IMC must confirm that the IRA takes any actions it promises. When the Taoiseach joined the meeting, he said that verification would have to include witnesses of decommissiong (probably clergy), in addition to the IICD, as layed out December 8.
    ...QUIET MARCHING SEASON NECESSARY
    ¶6. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX Reiss and the Ambassador agreed that tensions were high as marching season approaches, and it is vitally important that violence is averted. That message needs to be delivered to all parties. The Ambassador asked who is engaging with the Parades Commission; XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is a disconnect between the Parades Commission and the PSNI. All agreed that a violent marching season could set back prospects for political progress.
    ...DUP FLEXING ITS MUSCLES, INCLUDING REGARDING POLICING BOARD
    ¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and Reiss exchanged views on the DUP, following their big win in UK elections. The Ambassador noted that DUP is looking to flex its muscles, and should not be allowed to unwind existing mechanisms, such as the Policing Board, whose mandate expires October 18. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed and said the GOI favors renewing the policing board in its current form.
    -------------------------------
    TAOISEACH DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD
    -------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) The Taoiseach joined the meeting, and layed out his vision of the way forward. Like XXXXXXXXXXXX he felt any deal was many months away, with talks not starting until September and a deal not likely until January. The Taoiseach then discussed what he felt was realistic to expect from the IRA. He said that no one can expect the IRA to agree to disband; rather, it could enter a new commemorative role. His own father, he said, considered himself to be an IRA man to the day he died in the 1990’s. IRA members, he said, consider themselves to be soldiers and their IRA membership is the center of their lives. They could, however, convert to a commemorative organization that visits graves and plans events to mark the anniversaries of atrocities. The Taoiseach said he had explained this to DUP leader Ian Paisley. By the same token, the Taoiseach said Sinn Fein knows that they have milked the process as much as they can. He said that “Gerry understands criminality must end”, even if he will not say that the IRA has been involved in crime.
    ¶9. (C) Reiss described changes in perception within the Irish-American community. Their conversations with the Taoiseach, and the IRA’s words and actions following the McCartney murder were giving them a more realistic view of the IRA. The Taoiseach agreed, but noted that it is still hard for much of Irish-America to accept that the IRA was involved in the murder. Reiss then informed the Taoiseach that the US had refused Sinn Fein member Rita O’Hare’s visa request.
    ...TAOISEACH RAISES FINUCANE
    ¶10. (C) The Taoiseach raised the Finucane case, as did every other GOI official with whom Reiss met. Reiss briefed him on his talks in London, including with the head of MI5, who committed to turning over all evidence her agency has to the inquiry, but she was adamant that the inquiry will proceed using the new legislation. Reiss noted his concern that the Finucane case will become an irritant in Irish relations with the UK and get in the way of a deal. The Taoiseach said that the entire parliament was united in opposition to the UK approach. Parliament does not believe the UK will give all evidence because, in its view, the UK did not cooperate fully with the Barron commission’s investigation into the 1974 Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The Taoiseach said that the GOI wants the UK to provide evidence acknowledging its involvement in Finucane’s murder and it wants to know how high in the UK government collusion went. He said if the UK were to provide the information, it would only grab the headlines for a few hours because “everyone knows the UK was involved.” Other ministers made the same point and noted that the Taoiseach is particularly seized with the Finucane case and would have to personally approve any compromise to ease the dispute with the UK, such as Reiss’ suggestion of putting an Irish judge in charge of the inquiry.
    --------------------------------------------- ---
    FM ECHOES PM ON IRA, GFA, CONCERN ABOUT FINUCANE AND MARCHING SEASON
    --------------------------------------------- ---
    ....IRA
    ¶11. (C) FM Ahern said he liked Reiss’ public comments that the IRA should respond “sooner rather than later,” and he agreed with Reiss that the IRA statement must be clean, with no ambiguity, and that the three governments need to agree on what they want from the IRA. In the end, the DUP must also be on board in order for a deal to be struck. FM Ahern was adamant that the Irish government was interested in a comprehensive deal only, and was concerned that the UK might be open to Sinn Fein’s desire to cut a side deal with London. He said that such talks between the UK and IRA were underway in December between the breakdown of talks and the Northern Bank robbery. Such a deal, he said, would have allowed Sinn Fein to barter decommissioning for concessions. Moreover, he said, a bilateral deal between the UK and Sinn Fein would polarize the situation in Northern Ireland.
    ...Sinn Fein
    ¶12. (C) FM Ahern said that Sinn Fein knows serious negotiations cannot begin unless trust is re-established. On the other hand, he said, maybe that’s not what they want. (Note: FM Ahern is here referencing the theory that Sinn Fein finds engaging in the peace process in its interest because it softens the image of the party and gives them photo opportunities with prime ministers. According to this theory, the process is in Sinn Fein’s interest, but Sinn Fein is not actually interested in striking a deal.) FM Ahern also touched on the balance the GOI tries to strike in talking about and to Sinn Fein. He said PSNI and others told the GOI that its tough line on Sinn Fein since December had been helpful but no longer was, and they should “lighten up.” On the other hand, the GOI also is asked why it talks to Sinn Fein at all, given that the International Monitoring Commission reports that they are continuining their activities. He noted that it is difficult for the two prime ministers to say “no” when Gerry Adams asks for a meeting. He said Sinn Fein is insisting on working out details at the top level of government only. (COMMENT: This is tactically smart of Gerry Adams, especially if he, like others, sees the Taoiseach as less tough on republicans than the outspoken Justice Minister or quieter but equally firm Foreign Minister.)
    ...Parade Season
    ¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said intelligence sources were worried that malcontents were planning to disrupt the marching season. He noted that the DUP and Orange Order were “playing games” with the Parades Commission, and repeated the view that PSNI and the Parades Commission were not connecting well. He said the GOI is particularly worried about the “walk back” -- after the parades and drinking, when marchers and hangers on walk back through republican areas. Special Envoy Reiss said that a violent marching season would play into the hands of those who believe that only the IRA can protect Catholic communities.
    ...Finucane
    ¶14. (C) FM Ahern raised the Finucane case, saying categorically that the UK was not complying with its 2001 Weston Park commitments. He said the GOI has lived up to its obligations and begun investigations into several cases. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the UK had pushed through its new Inquiries Act and that the Finucane family would not cooperate on that basis. ...Policing Board

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    Default 05dublin657, northern ireland: Goi waiting for ira response and

    Part 2

    ¶15. (C) Special Envoy Reiss noted that the Policing Board was set to expire on October 18, and asked for Irish views, including on whether there were policy consequences of choosing to “continue” the board or to “reconstitute” it. FM Ahern said he had spoken to Northern Ireland Secretary of State Peter Hain about the issue. He said the GOI favors continuing the board, but the DUP wants to reconstitute it. He asserted that the DUP has no legal right to demand reconstitution on the basis of its electoral gains. FM Ahern also said he had raised IRA crime with Peter Hain, especially in the context of cross border cooperation between the Irish Criminal Assets Bureau and the Northern Ireland equivalent.
    ...International Fund for Ireland (IFI)
    ¶16. (C) As he has done publicly, FM Ahern talked about the importance of continuing IFI activities and the need to maintain donations from other governments. He said it is increasingly difficult to tap EU peace and reconciliation funds. FM Ahern talked about the need to reorient the board toward reconciliation and policing, and noted the board was considering a five-year strategy, ending in closure. He asked for U.S. views. The Ambassador noted that supporters of Ireland in the U.S. understand that the Ireland’s economic boom means that international contributions to IFI will end at some point. One difficulty, he said, is that unionists only recently have taken part, and will insist on getting their fair share of grants. Special Envoy Reiss said that the IFI’s new ideas for policing are likely to be acceptable under U.S. law.
    --------------------------------------------
    Justice Minister McDowell focuses on the IRA
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶17. (C) Justice Minister McDowell, always the hardest hitting of the Irish cabinet, opened the meeting by saying that the Good Friday Agreement presumed the IRA would go out of business and it is still in business seven years later. He said the provisional movement (as he refers to jointly to the IRA and Sinn Fein) regards its arms cache as an embarrassment. Its semtex and kalishnakovs do not serve any useful purpose, he said, and the provisionals do not want to leave weapons in the hands of dissidents. He said the provisionals consider their arms stash a political liability that undermines their claim to be pursuing their goals through peaceful means only.
    ¶18. (C) Minister McDowell believes the provisionals want to close down the hardware side of their operation but to stay in business to fund national and international programs. He also said that the provisionals give no indication of loosening their grip on national areas in Northern Ireland where PSNI does not go. For that reason, he noted, the provisionals want to hold on to personal weapons.
    ¶19. (C) McDowell said some lessons have been learned about how to deal with the provisional movement. McDowell said that you only get concessions from the provisionals when you put your hand on their throat. When you play their propaganda game, they press for concessions. McDowell said he was “delighted” that Sinn Fein was not invited to the White House on March 17. Looking forward, he said, the GOI was not in appeasement mode, and should offer a cold shoulder to the provisionals. Sinn Fein, he said, is “asking for warm words” but governments should not offer them. He credited Sinn Fein with being “brilliant negotiators.” They create eagerness and a sense of partnership, as if to say, “let’s get together to sort out Sinn Fein problems.” What they cannot stand, he said, is skepticism. McDowell said he has warned Peter Hain against side deals with the provisionals, especially now that there is no center ground in Northern Ireland.
    ----------------------------
    Finance Minister Brian Cowen
    ----------------------------
    ¶20. (C) In pursuing a political solution for Northern Ireland, the British and Irish Governments needed to address the economic dimension to the peace process, Finance Minister Brian Cowen told Ambassador Reiss in a May 20 meeting. Cowen cautioned against an approach that focused on establishing institutions of self-government, while neglecting equally urgent economic imperatives, such as improving social services and tacking unemployment. He expressed concern that HMG might wish to disengage from these challenges after a solution was reached. While the British Exchequer had made statements on the limits of UK financial support for the peace process, Cowen believed that HMG and the GOI could jointly foster a transition in Northern Ireland toward an economic system less dominated by the public sector. This cooperation could take the form of coordinating Ireland’s National Spatial Strategy with the North’s development plans; there was also the possibility of harmonizing tax rates and key commodity prices to spur cross-border investment. Ambassador Reiss agreed that it was important to avoid scenarios where economic difficulties would continue to fuel social tensions even after a political resolution was in hand.
    ¶21. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/P. KENNY

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    Default 05dublin936, update on ira money-laundering investigation

    Wednesday, 27 July 2005, 16:10
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000936
    SIPDIS
    LONDON FOR POL AND LEGATT
    EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
    TAGS PREL, EFIN, SOCI, KCRM, EI, NIPP
    SUBJECT: UPDATE ON IRA MONEY-LAUNDERING INVESTIGATION
    REF: A. STATE 104288
    ¶B. DUBLIN 210 C. SOFIA 1108
    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Jonathan S. Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
    ¶1. (C) Summary: Irish criminal justice officials are convinced that pound sterling notes seized in Dublin and Cork in mid-February in an apparent IRA-tied money-laundering scheme was money stolen from Belfast’s Northern Bank. Police are attempting to establish forensic links between the seizures and robbery in order to bring charges by late 2005, with a court case to follow a year later. Irish investigators continue to pursue a possible Bulgarian link to the money-laundering scheme, but are reluctant to provide details on exchanges with Bulgarian counterparts. The Bulgarian Ambassador in Dublin denies any Bulgarian involvement and wishes that Ireland would close off this line of inquiry publicly. Irish officials, more generally, remain concerned that IRA funds acquired through sophisticated investments are seeping into resources available for Sinn Fein’s political activities in the Republic of Ireland. Post expects that Irish officials will remain reticent on details of the money-laundering investigation until charges are filed. End summary.
    Linking the Bank Robbery and Money Seizures
    -------------------------------------------
    ¶2. (C) The roughly STG 3 million seized in Dublin and Cork the week of February 14 (ref B) is “beyond doubt” a portion of the STG 26.5 million stolen from Belfast’s Northern Bank on December 20, 2004, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Department of Justice, Equality, and Law Reform (DOJ)XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX related to Emboff the GOI’s belief that up to 16 individuals questioned by Garda (police) in connection with the seizures were attempting to launder the stolen proceeds on behalf of the Provisional IRA (PIRA). This belief was based on information provided by Garda intelligence assets and by “walk-ins” who, in some instances, voluntarily turned over cash that they had been asked to hide (STG 300,000 in one case). While intelligence pointed clearly to a money-laundering operation, the challenge was to build forensic ties between the money seized and the stolen Northern Bank notes in order to support a court conviction. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Garda, led by the Criminal Assets Bureau, were still attempting to establish forensic links through the tracking system used by the Northern Bank for bank note bundles in its possession at the time of December robbery.
    ¶3. (C) If such ties could be established before autumn, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), James Hamilton, would be in a position to bring money-laundering charges by late 2005 against a number of those questioned, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. (To date, no one has been charged, except a XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was charged with membership in the IRA, an illegal organization. XXXXXXXXXXXX Once charges are brought, it would likely take a year to begin the court case. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Hamilton could possibly opt for a special non-jury criminal court consisting of three judges, an option that was sometimes used for cases involving unlawful organizations like the IRA. When Emboff asked who would likely face charges, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that, of those brought in for Garda questioning, no one had been ruled out as beyond suspicion XXXXXXXXXXXX He added that the operative legislation in the case would likely be the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1997, rather than the Criminal Justice Act of 2005, since the latter focused primarily on terrorism.
    ¶4. (C) In separate discussions with the Ambassador, DCM, and Emboffs, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that investigations into the money-laundering case could still take several months, as police used DNA and other scientific techniques to pursue a connection to the Northern Bank raid. He commented that the money-laundering operation had been poorly conducted, due most likely to the unexpected size of the bank haul. Investigators were focused primarily on Ted Cunningham and XXXXXXXXXXXX
    -----------------------
    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    ¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
    -----------------------------------
    ¶7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX
    ---------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) More generally, the DOJ and Garda continue to be concerned that money illegally acquired by the IRA was “seeping” into resources available for Sinn Finn’s political activities in the Republic of Ireland, said the DOJXXXXXXXXXXXX. The difficulty lay in documenting the mixing of such funds. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) was similarly concerned that political donations obtained by Sinn Fein in the United States and elsewhere overseas were being spent in the South. (Under a 2002 SIPO ruling, Sinn Fein can accept donations from non-Irish citizens in foreign countries, but only for activities outside the Republic of Ireland, i.e., in Northern Ireland.) He noted that the DOJ would be interested to see whether and how the IRA might address criminality in its expected response to Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams’ call for an end to republican paramilitarism. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the awaited IRA statement would have no bearing on the money-laundering case or other investigations into possible IRA crimes committed since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
    ¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that IRA money was constantly moving, flowing from diversified sources into wide-ranging investments. While the IRA had been proficient in smuggling, robbery, and racketeering since the 1970s, the Celtic Tiger economic boom of the 1990s had prompted the IRA to diversify into more sophisticated business enterprises. IRA investments now included real estate ventures in Dublin, London, and Spanish resort areas, handled by apparently respectable businessmen. XXXXXXXXXXXX also expressed concern about the commingling of ill-gotten IRA funds with Sinn Fein’s political coffers in the Republic of Ireland. The irony, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, was that Sinn Fein was already raising substantial sums for its political activities in the South through legal avenues. He pointed out, for example, that Sinn Fein conducted at least 60 fund-raisers in the South per week for its electoral war chest.
    Comment: GOI Reticence
    ----------------------
    ¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear to Emboffs that the ongoing investigation into the money-laundering case constrained their ability to provide more information, as the lack of detail in their observations bears out. We expect that GOI officials will remain reticent until charges are actually filed, a step that may also be delayed by continuing investigations into the Northern Bank robbery itself. Garda and DOJ representatives are also likely to continue to be quiet in public and in discussions with us regarding funding of Sinn Fein,s activities in the Republic of Ireland. As a political force in the South, Sinn Fein has limited reach, but is seen as the most well-organized and best-funded party. Competing parties, including the governing Fianna Fail party, are anxious to ensure that Sinn Fein members/supporters abide by Irish law and are subject to public scrutiny when they do not. Both the Garda (traditionally tough on the republican movement writ large, due to its terrorist connections) and political levels of the government will be careful to avoid the public perception that any legal pursuit of Sinn Fein/IRA-tied personalities in the South is politically connected. KENNY

  11. #41
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    Default 06dublin623, prime minister ahern takes “hard line” on deadline

    Wednesday, 31 May 2006, 16:37
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000623
    SIPDIS
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
    TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, EI
    SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AHERN TAKES “HARD LINE” ON DEADLINE
    FOR NORTHERN EXECUTIVE
    REF: DUBLIN 562
    DUBLIN 00000623 001.2 OF 003
    Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
    ¶1. (C) Summary: The Irish Government would not agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Assembly to form an Executive, due to the likely distractions of the mid-2007 Irish general elections, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that fleshing out details for the Northern parties on a post-November fallback plan (“Plan B”) would distract their attention from the deadline. (Comment: Whether or not the Irish and British Governments stick to the November 24 deadline, Ahern,s strong remarks are a clear signal to the parties, which the GOI would like the USG to reinforce in discussions with Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).) Ahern believed that Sinn Fein would not endorse joint policing except with the formation of the Executive, though he and Reiss concurred that there had been recent republican progress in interaction with the police. Ahern also expressed disappointment with the DUP,s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, and Reiss noted that DUP leader Ian Paisley was likely to ignore the November deadline in public defiance of the Irish and British Governments. In a separate discussion, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern told Reiss that a single, Southern-hosted investment conference on the North would be preferable to two separate conferences (a view that Northern Secretary Peter Hain accepted in a May 24 phone call with Reiss). In another meeting, Justice Minister Micheal McDowell briefed Reiss and the Ambassador on pending Northern-related legal casesXXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.
    The November 24 Deadline and Plan B
    -----------------------------------
    ¶2. (C) Under no circumstances would the Irish Government agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Ireland Assembly to form an Executive, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. Ahern explained that, if the deadline were not met, “Plan B” (indefinite suspension of the Assembly and joint UK/Irish stewardship of the Northern political process) would take effect, as the campaign for the expected May 2007 Irish general elections would preclude his continued involvement in Northern negotiations. He added that he had been clear with the British Government on this point and that any effort to establish an Executive after November 24 would fall to the parties. Ahern said he would not be surprised, however, if the parties were to press for a delay beyond the deadline, notwithstanding the long lead-up to November. (Comment: Were the Irish and British Governments to hold the line on the November 24 deadline, they would be showing atypical resolve. We suspect that the decision whether or not to extend the deadline will be taken closer to the date.)
    ¶3. (C) While Plan B would help force the parties, feet to the fire, fleshing out Plan B in more detail now would distract the parties from the November 24 deadline, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, who also attended the meeting with Ahern and Reiss. In any case, Plan B has not been drafted, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX. He expressed hope that the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) report due in early October would show enough republican progress on criminality to catalyze the negotiations, keeping the focus off Plan B. He added that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) risked a huge tactical error in believing that a deal might be achievable after November 24, since Sinn Fein might abandon the negotiation process completely after that deadline.
    The DUP’s Refusal to Engage
    ---------------------------
    ¶4. (C) Ahern expressed disappointment with the DUP’s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, particularly “childish” tactics at the Northern Assembly Stormont Buildings like ducking out of elevators carrying Sinn Fein members. He pointed out that there had been over 30 instances of quiet contact between the DUP and Sinn Fein during the December 2004 negotiations. Since the collapse of those talks and the subsequent Northern Bank robbery and McCartney murder, engagement had ceased. Ahern cited Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams’ view that the IRA’s July 2005 decision to decommission weapons should have merited renewed contact with the DUP at some level, not
    DUBLIN 00000623 002.2 OF 003
    necessarily with DUP leader Ian Paisley. DUP resistance to engagement, he added, was leading the republican community to question Adams’ overall strategy for the peace process. Ahern admitted that he did not know what would make the DUP speak with Sinn Fein, and he hoped that the Northern Assembly’s proposed Restoration Committee might be a vehicle for interaction. (At roughly the same time as Special Envoy Reiss’ meeting with Ahern, Paisley announced that the DUP would not take part in the Committee as a mechanism for negotiations.)
    Policing and Sinn Fein
    ----------------------
    ¶5. (C) The Northern policing issue would not be resolved until the formation of the Executive, said Ahern. He elaborated that Sinn Fein tacticians would not want to “hand over their last card” with a commitment to joint policing before November, since the DUP would then discount that card in the negotiations. Ahern doubted that the DUP even wanted the devolution of policing at this point. He added that there was therefore little sense in making Sinn Fein endorsement for joint policing a precondition in the Northern negotiations. He added, however, that the republican community was increasingly amenable to such an endorsement.
    2006: Good Progress and Next Steps
    ----------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) On the whole, 2006 has been a very positive year, particularly in terms of progress in the republican community, Ahern observed. He noted that there was increasing engagement on the ground between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and republican areas of Belfast. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that the Irish and British Governments were pleasantly surprised by the public’s and parties’ reactions to the April 6 statement that the Assembly would reconvene. The only negative republican occurrences during the year, said Ahern, had been the April 4 murder of Denis Donaldson (the former IRA official who was out-ed as a British informant), the robbery of a liquor truck by alleged IRA members, and the discovery of a 250 lb. fertilizer bomb in Lurgan. Ahern maintained that these incidents were the work of IRA breakaway groups who were not connected with Sinn Fein leadership. He added that Sinn Fein seemed surprised and shaken by the Donaldson murder and, ironically, had supported the April 6 statement calling for reestablishment of Stormont even more strongly as a result.
    ¶7. (C) In terms of next steps, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that Prime Ministers Ahern and Blair planned to meet with all parties on June 26. In the expectation that there would be no progress by that point, the goal of the late June consultations would be to map out the agenda for the period remaining before late November. The Governments, added XXXXXXXXXXXX, would then “bed down for the summer.” He explained that the Irish Government would continue to listen carefully to the parties’ rhetoric in order to gauge their seriousness about making the Good Friday Agreement work.
    Reiss: No Urgency among Parties
    -------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) In his discussion with the Taoiseach (and in separate meetings, per paras below), Special Envoy Reiss reported from his May 19 discussions at Stormont that he sensed no urgency among the parties, particularly the DUP, to commence work on an Executive deal. He noted that DUP was likely to ignore the November 24 deadline in public defiance of the British and Irish Governments. The DUP also appeared confident that it could achieve in the first few months after November any deal that was achievable by November 24. Reiss elaborated that DUP leaders indicated no intention of engaging Sinn Fein, partly out of fear that negotiations with Gerry Adams would see the unionist community “lose its shirt.”
    ¶9. (C) Sinn Fein leaders, by contrast, were relaxed in their discussions with Reiss, with Gerry Adams focused on USG permission for fund-raising activities in the United States in the fall. Reiss believed that Adams was prepared to endorse joint policing, not only to avoid blame if the November 24 deadline passed, but also to project a positive political image for Sinn Fein in the South’s 2007 general elections. Adams also suggested that a Sinn Fein Executive Council decision, rather than a full party conference, might be sufficient to endorse policing. Reiss agreed with the Taoiseach that there had been progress in the republican community, as was evident from friendly interaction with the PSNI that would have been impossible six months ago.
    DUBLIN 00000623 003.2 OF 003
    FM Ahern Opposes Proposals for Two Investment Conferences
    --------------------------------------------- ------------
    ¶10. (C) In a separate discussion that reviewed most of the issues raised in the Taoiseach’s meeting, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern said that there was no point in having two Northern Ireland investment conferences in the fall that would be sponsored by the North and South, respectively. He remarked that whereas plans for the proposed Northern-sponsored conference lacked focus and details, the South’s conference would work and would proceed regardless. Reiss agreed that a single conference would be better, and he asked for the opportunity to speak first to the British Government about this preference. (Comment: On May 24, Reiss discussed the conference proposal with Northern Secretary Peter Hain, who agreed to put off the Northern-sponsored conference until 2007.)
    DOJ Update on Legal Cases
    -------------------------
    ¶11. (C) Special Envoy Reiss and the Ambassador also met with Minister of Justice and Equality Michael McDowell. Irish Department of Justice (DOJ)officialsXXXXXXXXXXXX who made the following points about Northern Ireland-related legal cases:
    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    B) Money Launderers. Before November, the Irish Government would bring charges against several individuals connected to the police seizure of several million pound sterling in February 2005, believed to be from the 2004 Northern Bank robbery.XXXXXXXXXXXX
    E) Denis Donaldson. McDowell believed that the out-ing of Denis Donaldson as an informant was a clear message from the British Government that it had another, more valuable, source of information within the republican leadership. He reiterated the Taoiseach’s point, however, that Sinn Fein leaders appeared to have had no connection to Donaldson’s murder. KENNY

  12. #42
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    Default Sticky: Wikileaks: The Irish US State Department Cables

    Day one of the Indo Wikileaks US State Department cables.

    https://irishindoleaks.wordpress.com/


    The Indo has been highly selective in what it published.

    If anyone has access to any other Irish cables, please pm me a link and I'll add them here.
    Last edited by C. Flower; 27-08-2011 at 01:28 PM.

  13. #43
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    Default Re: Sticky: Wikileaks: The Irish US State Department Cables

    A good crop of Irish leaks here

    http://www.cablegatesearch.net/search.php

  14. #44
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    Default Re: Wikileaks American Cables on Ireland.

    http://t.co/o2n88ki

    WIKILEAKS RELEASE: 493 Ireland-US embassy cables! wikileaks.org/tag/EI_0.html

  15. #45
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    Default Re: Wikileaks American Cables on Ireland.

    There seem to be no entries beyond page 8 on your link. Would you mind posting the link again?

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