Wikileaks American Cables on Ireland. [Archive] - Politics ~ Irish & International

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Munnkeyman

30-11-2010, 09:19 PM

I've decided to setup a thread to record and discuss the Cables
between the American Embassy in Dublin
and the State Department in Washington.

Records currently released so far... 1447 out of 251,287.

Number of Records from Ireland... 9 out of 633.

Unfortunately nothing has been released pertaining to Ireland as of yet,
but it will be interesting to see the communiques between Dublin and Washington for the period 2008 - 2010.

Link is below
http://cablegatewikileaks.org/

Hopefully over the next couple of days we will see a few.

C. Flower

30-11-2010, 09:21 PM

Thanks Munnkeyman - I was trying to fathom this out and looking forward to seeing them.

Munnkeyman

30-11-2010, 09:32 PM

Thanks Munnkeyman - I was trying to fathom this out and looking forward to seeing them.

There is some 'interesting' information there already.

For example Muammar al-Gaddafi
Really likes Flamenco dancing and horse racing.
Always has to stay on the top floor of any building he sleeps in,
but will only walk up 35 steps on a flight of stairs,
and doesn't take flights longer than 8 hours. :D
A simple man for the people.

I would love to know the take on BIFFO and Lendahand.;)

C. Flower

30-11-2010, 09:55 PM

Mind if I start an "are Wikileaks genuine" poll :D ?

Munnkeyman

30-11-2010, 10:21 PM

Mind if I start an "are Wikileaks genuine" poll :D ?

Not at all.
I have my doubts too.;)
Disinformation and politics aren't strangers.
I believe that the DARPA Information Awareness Office (formerly led by
John Poindexter who has a history of supplying and fabricating evidence Iran- Contra, Libya etc.)
have a large hand to play in this.

Dr. FIVE

01-12-2010, 10:59 AM

Here we go

EMERGING CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. MILITARY TRANSITS

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06DUBLIN1020.html

Looks dodgy to me tbh. I will need to change my vote to no.

Although supportive of continued U.S.
military transits at Shannon Airport, the Irish Government
has informally begun to place constraints on U.S. operations
at the facility, mainly in response to public sensitivities
over U.S. actions in the Middle East.

Seán Ryan

01-12-2010, 11:03 AM

US Embassy Dublin Documents Leaked – Shannon Airport (http://www.teaandtoast.ie/?p=399)

moss

01-12-2010, 11:22 AM

I've decided to setup a thread to record and discuss the Cables
between the American Embassy in Dublin
and the State Department in Washington.

Records currently released so far... 291 out of 251,287.

Number of Records from Ireland.
633 Ireland EI Country.

Unfortunately nothing has been released pertaining to Ireland as of yet,
but it will be interesting to see the communiques between Dublin and Washington for the period 2008 - 2010.

Link is below
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/

Hopefully over the next couple of days we will see a few.

This link takes me to a blank page.

Is this the same for anyone else ?

Munnkeyman

01-12-2010, 12:16 PM

This link takes me to a blank page.

Is this the same for anyone else ?

Try to refresh once or twice as they are, I believe,
still undergoing a DDOS attack, so your request might not get
through to their servers.
When you get through try to download the site as an archive.
If you can't get through to the site use this
torrent link to download the site contents.

http://file.wikileaks.org/torrent/cablegate/cablegate-201012011301.7z.torrent

"http://file.wikileaks.org/torrent/cablegate/cablegate-201012011301.7z.torrent"

moss

01-12-2010, 12:27 PM

Cheers Munnkeyman, refresh done the trick.

C. Flower

01-12-2010, 12:49 PM

Try to refresh once or twice as they are, I believe,
still undergoing a DDOS attack, so your request might not get
through to their servers.
When you get through try to download the site as an archive.
If you can't get through to the site use this
torrent link to download the site contents.

http://file.wikileaks.org/torrent/cablegate/cablegate-201012011301.7z.torrent

"http://file.wikileaks.org/torrent/cablegate/cablegate-201012011301.7z.torrent"

Please, Munnkeyman, as you clearly know what you are doing, would you be able to download this material to an album or thread on this site and link it here?

We can't rely on permanent access to that server.

Munnkeyman

01-12-2010, 01:30 PM

Here's the first cable on Ireland saved as a text file.
I'll update this post with them as they arrive.

antiestablishmentarian

01-12-2010, 02:36 PM

With regards to the poll, I think it is for real for the following reasons, people who leak to it are at risk of stiff sentences which they surely wouldn't be if it was a purely establishment site, plus Assange seems to be on the verge of being stitched up by Interpol which again wouldn't happen if he was a CIA asset. It's correct to be skeptical about their motivations, especially when releasing information such as the North Korean and Iranian cables which only serve to benefit the interests of US imperialism, but I don't think they validate concerns that wikileaks is the stooge of a particular government.

Gruffalo

01-12-2010, 03:00 PM

Kev Bar

01-12-2010, 03:30 PM

US Embassy Dublin Documents Leaked – Shannon Airport (http://www.teaandtoast.ie/?p=399)

Any more Sean?
Anything on Ulick McEvaddy's contract mid air refueling of US military planes.
The Dow Jones report on the contract had the following interesting sentence.

"Mr McEvaddy refused to discuss any rendition related overtures."

That smells like ....

Re poll
What few cables I've read seem credible.

Lapsedmethodist

01-12-2010, 03:35 PM

Kev Bar

01-12-2010, 03:36 PM

Mind if I start an "are Wikileaks genuine" poll :D ?

Can I do a 'is Cactus operating out of the Pentagon?' poll.

Note the vague nature of yr snow comment.

I suspect deep deep deep cover in yr basement and an ardent anti-yankee front.

As the red tops say: Gotcha. (suitable emoticon).

C. Flower

01-12-2010, 03:49 PM

Can I do a 'is Cactus operating out of the Pentagon?' poll.

You're very welcome to, if you wish.

Note the vague nature of yr snow comment.

I suspect deep deep deep cover in yr basement and an ardent anti-yankee front.

As the red tops say: Gotcha. (suitable emoticon).

A redtop post, with a Thatcher tag line. :) I suspect a very pro yankee front on your part. Different people have different standpoints or no-one here would have anything to say.

C. Flower

01-12-2010, 03:54 PM

Thanks, Munnkeyman. I'll post it here too for easy reading:- The questions in my mind looking at these cables are

- is there anything new in them ?

If there is anything new in them

- is there anything in them which is deeply damaging to the US ?
- is there anything in them which might result in benefits to the US ?

__________________________________________________ _______________________

VZCZCXRO1309
RR RUEHAG
DE RUEHDL #1020/01 2481445
ZNY CCCCC
ZZH R 051445Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7414 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0043 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RHCUAAA/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 001020 SIPDIS SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL EAIR PTER EI
SUBJECT: EMERGING CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. MILITARY TRANSITS AT SHANNON REF: A. DUBLIN 891
Â¶B. DUBLIN 709 Â
¶C. USDAO DUBLIN EI U-0011-06 Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Â¶1. (C) This is an action request. Please see para 10.

Â¶2. (C) Summary: Although supportive of continued U.S. military transits at Shannon Airport,
the Irish Government has informally begun to place constraints on U.S. operations at the facility,
mainly in response to public sensitivities over U.S. actions in the Middle East.
Shannon remains a key transit point for U.S. troops and materiel bound for theaters in the global war on terror,
while yielding diplomatic benefits for the Irish Government and significant revenues for the airport and regional economy.
Segments of the Irish public, however, see the airport as a symbol of Irish complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in the Gulf/Middle
East and in regard to extraordinary renditions, a view that underpinned a recent jury decision to acquit the "Shannon Five" protesters
who damaged a U.S. naval aircraft. The Irish Government has repeatedly defended U.S. interests in the face of public criticism,
but has recently introduced more cumbersome notification requirements for equipment-related transits in the wake of the Lebanon conflict.
These requirements, which entail a more expansive interpretation of munitions of war, are designed to give the Irish Government mor
latitude to decide on allowable transits, accoring to a senior Department of Foreign Affairs oficial.
We suspect that the Government aims with tese new constraints to dampen public criticism ahead of the 2007 general elections,
and we would apreciate Department gudance on a USG response, including on any next steps regarding the Shannon Five.
End summary.

Shannon: Significant Benefits and Sensitivities --------------------------------------------- --

Â¶3. (SBU) U.S. military access to Shannon Airport in western Ireland is among the most tangible benefits of traditionally
strong U.S.-Irish relations. For the United States, geography makes Shannon a key transit point for military flights and military contract
flights carrying personnel and materiel to Iraq and the Middle East/Gulf theater in the global war on terror, as well as to Europe and Africa.
In 2005, roughly 340,000 U.S. troops passed through Shannon on nearly 2,500 contract carrier flights; about 450 equipment-related/distinguished-visitor transit milair flights and thousands of airspace overflights also took place. Approximately 220,000 troops have transited to date this year.
For Ireland, U.S. military transits not only demonstrate bilateral cooperation in support of U.S. objectives in the Gulf/Middle East,
but also generate significant revenue for Shannon Airport and the regional economy. In 2005, the airport turned a euro 2.9 million profit
after earning roughly euro 10.3 million from services for transit flights, including landing, parking, catering, and fuel.
The economic gains for the Shannon area are less easily calculated, but would include, at a minimum, payments for hotels, food/beverages,
transportation, and cultural activities that come with 8-10 overnight stops per year for roughly 200 soldiers each time. (Revenues may fall in 2006,
as World Airways, a DOD-contract carrier, has begun to transfer operations from Shannon to its Leipzig hub for internal logistical reasons.)

Â¶4. (SBU) For segments of the Irish public, however, the visibility of U.S. troops at Shannon has made the airport
a symbol of Irish complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in the Gulf/Middle East. This popular sentiment was manifest in the
July 25 jury decision to acquit the "Shannon Five," a group of anti-war protesters who damaged a U.S. naval aircraft at the airport
in 2003 in the belief that they would prevent loss of life in Iraq (ref A). Members of the Shannon Five have subsequently called for a
mass demonstration in Dublin on September 23 (capitalizing on publicity for the September 21-24 Ryder Cup tournament and the return of
university students) as part of a campaign to "demilitarize" the airport. Although it is by no means clear that any protest will reach "mass"
proportions, participation in the planned protest will likely draw from a vocal anti-war lobby that has demonstrated against U.S. use of Shannon
from the start of the Iraq War up through the recent Lebanon conflict. DUBLIN 00001020 002 OF 003 In late 2005/early 2006, EU-wide debate on extraordinary renditions similarly galvanized this lobby, and the Irish public generally, to question U.S. military access to the airport.

The Irish Government and Shannon --------------------------------

Â¶5. (C) The Irish Government consistently has acted to ensure continued U.S. military transits at Shannon in the face of public criticism.
Since the Shannon Five decision, for example, Irish authorities have upgraded airport security, doubling the number of police and military personnel
patrolling the facility and introducing rigorous checks at the parking lot and perimeter fence. (The upgrade is also partly a response to possible Islamic extremist threats.) Moreover, despite a general Government reluctance to challenge independent court decisions, Defense Minister Willie O'Dea and governing Fianna Fail party politicians have publicly questioned the legal merits of the Shannon Five jury decision. These public statements track with representations to the Irish Parliament by Government ministers over recent years and months in defense of U.S. practices at Shannon, including by Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, who cited U.S. assurances on renditions this past year to rebuff calls for random aircraft checks. In parliamentary debate this spring, Minister of State for Europe, Noel Treacy, dismissed renewed calls for random inspections following the transit of a U.S. military prisoner that occurred without prior notification to the Irish Government (ref B).

Â¶6. (C) Notwithstanding its general support for U.S. interests, the Irish Government has more recently begun to place limits on certain forms
of U.S. transits at Shannon. On August 15, the Irish Department of Transport informally advised Post by e-mail that all military equipment,
including HMMWVs and trucks, were to be considered "munitions of war," requiring prior notification to the Transport Department and exemption waivers for transshipment. In addition to diplomatic clearance requests for state aircraft, we have heretofore provided notification for troop transits (with accompanying weapons), hazmat, and actual weapons/munitions, but not non-lethal military articles. The Transport Department notice followed upon the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) oral but definitive decision during the Lebanon conflict to forbid U.S. military transits carrying munitions to Israel, a policy that DFA did not convey to Post before informing the media. Indications of this trend to constrain U.S. operations at Shannon first arose in the context of the extraordinary renditions issue. In late 2005, for instance, the DFA informally denied a DHS deportation transit through Shannon of convicted foreign nationals from the United States out of apparent concern that the public would misread the transit as a rendition.

Â¶7. (C) In an August 30 meeting with the DCM and emboff, DFA Political Director Rory Montgomery said that the Department of Transport's more encompassing approach to munitions of war and notification requirements reflected the Irish Government's interest in knowing the full scope of military materiel transiting Ireland. He recalled that the February shipment through Shannon of U.S. Apache helicopters to/from Israel, which the U.S. contract carrier had not listed as munitions of war, elicited parliamentary criticism and highlighted the need for clarity about the nature of materiel in transit (ref C). More expansive notification requirements that would apply to all countries would "make it easier" for the Irish Government to decide on allowable shipments, while remaining predisposed to respond quickly and positively to U.S. transit requests, said Montgomery. He added that the DFA would recommend that the Department of Transport consult with Post in the process of clarifying and publishing guidance on munitions of war. The DCM noted Post's intention to confer with the Transport Department, and he emphasized that broader notification requirements would make it more cumbersome to process materiel shipments, with the possibility that U.S. military planners would consider alternatives to Shannon as a transit hub.

Comment and Action Request --------------------------

Â¶8. (C) Comment: Irish sensitivities generally about foreign military usage of the airport often make any inadvertent DUBLIN 00001020 003 OF 003 breaches of Ireland's restrictive rules on foreign military transits more visible and problematic. A neutral country, Ireland has no military attache system, no SOFA for U.S. activities, and strict rules regarding weapons transits and the wearing of foreign military uniforms. Occasional and inadvertent breaches of weapons and uniform policies, like "failure" to notify transiting prisoners (ref B) and military equipment, are met with public and press scrutiny, but also with Government understanding. Any incident, however, that becomes the cause for a public debate about the U.S. use of Shannon will likely add pressure on the Government. Embassy has sought to manage the policy issues, notification requirements, and the coordination of transiting flights, overflights, refuelings, crew rest overnights, and equipment failure overnights with existing DAO and civilian Embassy resources on the ground. With the help of extra TDY support to the DAO office and a TDY EUCOM presence at Shannon airport (which is three-and-a-half hours from Dublin), we have managed the occasional problems adequately and well.

Â¶9. (C) More comment: We intend to engage other ranking DFA, Transport, and Irish Defense Department officials, upon their return from the August holiday period, on the reasons for new constraints at Shannon, particularly the novel interpretation of munitions of war and its application to other countries (Russian transits to Venezuela, for instance). The Irish public's overwhelming opposition to Israeli military actions in Lebanon has exacerbated the governing Fianna Fail party's sensitivity to public criticism ahead of Ireland's May 2007 general elections. The major opposition party, Fine Gael, supports continued U.S. military use of Shannon, but the Labour Party and the Green Party, Fine Gael's opposition partners, favor a review, if not reversal, of Irish policy on U.S. transits. Against this political backdrop, U.S. missteps at Shannon could easily become campaign grist, a Fianna Fail concern that mid-level DFA officials have cited in informal discussions with Post.
Compliance with the new rules (entailing notification for almost any U.S. military equipment transiting), if feasible from the U.S. logistical perspective, will require a higher order of coordination among TRANSCOM, Air Mobility Command, TACC, and the contract carriers.

Â¶10. (C) Action request: We would appreciate input from the Department and other USG agencies for our planned follow-on
discussions with Irish officials on Shannon. Embassy will diplomatically pursue the most workable arrangements possible with
Irish officials, but we would appreciate Washington's judgment as to whether the process of notification of almost everything of a
military nature (including by contract carriers) through Shannon is becoming too difficult to make the airport a preferred transit stop.
Guidance is also requested regarding the Shannon Five decision, an outcome that DFA Political Director Montgomery described as "bizarre"
and presumably not precedential. Our understanding is that the case, as a criminal matter, has run its course, as there is no possibility to
appeal a jury decision under Irish law. There may be an option to pursue the case as a civil matter, and Post would need authorization and
funding to contact local attorneys about this possibility. Another option would be to present an itemized bill for aircraft damages to the
Irish Government, either to seek compensation outright or, at least, to convey USG dissatisfaction with the Shannon Five verdict.

KENNY

Kev Bar

01-12-2010, 04:04 PM

C. Flower

01-12-2010, 04:32 PM

It's OK CF - I'll believe you are somewhere within a 200km radius of Bellmullet.

Now....

"Thanks, Munnkeyman. I'll post it here too for easy reading:- The questions in my mind looking at these cables are

- is there anything new in them ?

If there is anything new in them"

Remember 250,000 cables.
They don't all have earth shattering.
What they do read like is what they are supposed to be: diplomatic cables.
You wont find "let's take out the greens" in most of these genre of cables.

Can't see much US benefit there.

Some of them are classified as secret. If they are classified as secret, and there's nothing new, that in itself would be of interest.

If there is new stuff, it would be expected that some of it would be embarrassing, by the nature of the beast (secret communications).

If it included deliberate misinformation, it would be expected to have a damaging effect on "enemy" or rival states (causing suspicion and division, for example), to put pressure on allies (to hop into line with US interests in various ways) or else to support a particular US narrative (evil Iran for example).

Cables could be marked from 1 - 10 under those three categories, if anyone had a mind to do it. :)

Does anyone here know anything about the different classifications ?

C. Flower

01-12-2010, 04:33 PM

Kev Bar

01-12-2010, 04:38 PM

Hey Cactus, come on I have read my John le Carre.
The topic under discussion is the US cables re Shannon.

Gruffalo

01-12-2010, 04:39 PM

Has anyone been jailed yet ?

Bradley Manning is in custody awaiting trial.

Kev Bar

01-12-2010, 04:40 PM

Bradley Manning is in custody awaiting trial.

He was sussed around the "collateral damage" leak.

Munnkeyman

01-12-2010, 04:48 PM

Some of them are classified as secret. If they are classified as secret, and there's nothing new, that in itself would be of interest.

If there is new stuff, it would be expected that some of it would be embarrassing, by the nature of the beast (secret communications).

If it included deliberate misinformation, it would be expected to have a damaging effect on "enemy" or rival states (causing suspicion and division, for example), to put pressure on allies (to hop into line with US interests in various ways) or else to support a particular US narrative (evil Iran for example).

Cables could be marked from 1 - 10 under those three categories, if anyone had a mind to do it. :)

Does anyone here know anything about the different classifications ?

They are already classified into categories.

SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals/Governments/Non -US Citizens.)

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals/Governments/Non -US Citizens.)

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Top secret (None to be released)

This is the highest security level that is publicly disclosed and is defined as information that would cause "exceptionally grave damage" to national security if disclosed to the public.

Secret

This is the second-highest classification. Information is classified secret when its release would cause "serious damage" to national security. Most information that is classified is held at the secret sensitivity.

Confidential

This is the lowest classification level. It is defined as information that would "damage" national security if disclosed

Unclassified

This is information that can be released to individuals without a clearance, for official use only.

C. Flower

01-12-2010, 04:51 PM

Thanks, that's very helpful :)

Seán Ryan

01-12-2010, 10:36 PM

Any more Sean?
Anything on Ulick McEvaddy's contract mid air refueling of US military planes.
The Dow Jones report on the contract had the following interesting sentence.

"Mr McEvaddy refused to discuss any rendition related overtures."

That smells like ....

Re poll
What few cables I've read seem credible.

You're speaking of the Holy Grail Kev. There are so many folks that I know would love to get the details of McEvaddy's deals it's quite astonishing, considering that he's pretty much unknown as far as the general public are concerned. Get the dirt on him and lots of folks will need more than a shower. I've been looking and waiting myself for quite some time.

I've a feeling that the next batch of documents to be released will contain a lot more Irish stuff. All rumours presently mind you...

PaddyJoe

02-12-2010, 12:24 AM

A couple of interesting points from this cable:
FF bent over backwards to deflect criticism of the US use of Shannon and this was acknowledged by the US Embassy:

Moreover, despite a general Government reluctance to challenge independent court decisions, Defense Minister Willie O'Dea and governing Fianna Fail party politicians have publicly questioned the legal merits of the Shannon Five jury decision. These public statements track with representations to the Irish Parliament by Government ministers over recent years and months in defense of U.S. practices at Shannon, including by Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, who cited U.S. assurances on renditions this past year to rebuff calls for random aircraft checks. In parliamentary debate this spring, Minister of State for Europe, Noel Treacy, dismissed renewed calls for random inspections following the transit of a U.S. military prisoner that occurred without prior notification to the Irish Government (ref B).
Note the informal nature of much of the discussion with Irish officials:

On August 15, the Irish Department of Transport informally advised Post by e-mail that all military equipment,
including HMMWVs and trucks, were to be considered "munitions of war,"

In late 2005, for instance, the DFA informally denied a DHS deportation transit through Shannon of convicted foreign nationals from the United States out of apparent concern that the public would misread the transit as a rendition.

Against this political backdrop, U.S. missteps at Shannon could easily become campaign grist, a Fianna Fail concern that mid-level DFA officials have cited in informal discussions with Post
Also note that the Yanks were so unhappy about having a plane damaged at Shannon that they considered the possibility of a civil action for damages or presenting a bill to the Irish government:)

C. Flower

02-12-2010, 09:56 AM

Via aljazeera - Ireland is said to have held up arms shipments during the Lebanon war

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/12/20101224118125377.html

New revelations by whistle-blowing website, WikiLeaks, has shown that the Irish government moved to limit transfers of US weapons to Israel through its airports in the wake of the country's war with Lebanon in 2006.

The cable, sent from the US embassy in Ireland in 2006, said that "although supportive of continued US military transits at Shannon Airport, the Irish government has informally begun to place constraints on US operations at the facility, mainly in response to public sensitivities over US actions in the Middle East".

After the Israel-Lebanon war, the Israeli military said it needed to restore its depleted ammunition stocks, but the cable from James Kenny, the US ambassador to Ireland at the time, indicates that the Irish government was making it increasingly difficult for Israel-bound US weapons shipments to pass through its airport.

Kenny said that the Irish foreign office had protested to him over an incident in February 2006, when Apache helicopters were sent to Israel via Ireland without the local authorities being appropriately informed.

'Perceived US wrongdoing'

The cable said that the Irish department of transport required that any military equipment passing through the country required "prior notification" and "exemption waivers."

"The transport department notice followed upon the department of foreign affairs [DFA] oral but definitive decision during the Lebanon conflict to forbid US military transits carrying munitions to Israel ... a policy that the DFA did not convey to [the US embassy] before informing the media," it said.

The ambassador disclosed in the cable that "segments of the Irish public ... see the airport as a symbol of Irish complicity in perceived US wrongdoing in the Middle East."

He wrote that senior Irish officials told him informally that if the US made further mistakes in its conduct at the airport, the matter would become a central issue in Ireland's elections in 2007.

Kenny disclosed in the cable that the deputy head of mission warned Irish officials that the US would begin using other European airports, causing a loss of tens of millions of dollars for the Irish economy, if the policy continued.

Kev Bar

02-12-2010, 10:31 AM

You're speaking of the Holy Grail Kev. There are so many folks that I know would love to get the details of McEvaddy's deals it's quite astonishing, considering that he's pretty much unknown as far as the general public are concerned. Get the dirt on him and lots of folks will need more than a shower. I've been looking and waiting myself for quite some time.

I've a feeling that the next batch of documents to be released will contain a lot more Irish stuff. All rumours presently mind you...
Let's choose our chalice wisely. (Tee Hee)

Gruffalo

06-12-2010, 11:22 AM

Ciaron O'Reilly of the Pitstop Plowshares/Shannon 5 gave an excellent interview to Radio Adelaide this morning. He spoke of the case and the idea that Ireland should have taken a moral stand against the war and refused to allow Shannon to be used. Interview here:

http://radioadelaidebreakfast.wordpress.com/2010/12/06/australia-activist-ciaron-oreilly-referred-to-in-us-secret-cables-wikileaks/#comment-2497

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:18 PM

Monday, 26 July 2004, 07:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 001101
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/P AND EUR/UBI; NSC FOR VOLKER
EO 12958 DECL: 07/07/2014
TAGS EI, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, UK, EUN, NIPP
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND - IRISH PM TELLS SPECIAL ENVOY
REISS THAT IRISH AND BRITS READY FOR ONE FINAL PUSH TO CLOSE A DEAL
REF: LONDON 4943
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES KENNY PER 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Â¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss met on June 30 in Dublin with Irish Prime Minister Ahern and Foreign Minister Brian Cowen to review Irish/British efforts to lay the ground work for another effort at restoring devolved government in NI. Ahern confirmed that he and British PM Blair are prepared to host one last round of â€œhot houseâ€ negotiations with Sinn Fein (SF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the middle of September at a remote site in Scotland on an agreement to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland (NI). If those talks fail, Ahern indicated that a â€œplan Bâ€ (along the lines suggested by the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP)) for standing up NI institutions with a caretaker technocratic government might be worth considering. Subsequently, however, key Irish officials told the Ambassador and DCM that the GOI does not wish to float any notions of a â€œplan Bâ€ in advance of September meetings. Ahern and Cowen both expressed concern that the traditional July-August summer holiday season may keep SF and DUP from adequately preparing for intensive negotiations in early September. Cowen will have staff here in August working on plans. End Summary
MEETING WITH PM AHERN: THERE ARE DANGERS WITH A PLAN B BUT SDLP PROPOSAL MAY HAVE SOME MERIT
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Â¶2. (C) Attending with PM Ahern were XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Accompanying Special Envoy Reiss were Ambassador Kenny, S/P Green, and Emboff. Ahern said that there must be a concerted effort in September to get a SF-DUP deal; â€œwe canâ€™t keep going the way we have been.â€ He agreed with Reissâ€™ observation that the key ingredients for an agreement are convincing the parties that September is a make-or-break situation, helping SF leader Gerry Adams do a deal, and getting DUP commitments on implementation (of the deal). Also, there must be a credible â€œplan Bâ€ in reserve. Ahern noted that SF now has the political power and position to move forward, â€œbut I donâ€™t know if they will.â€ Ahern said that he was impressed with the DUP, but its proposed six-month hiatus (between a deal and implementation) is a non-starter because republicans will not accept that long gap; and it brings events too close to UK elections and Blairâ€™s upcoming (1/1/05) responsibilities as G-8 Chairman and EU President.
Â¶3. (C) Reiss agreed that DUP was showing an encouraging willingness to engage, adding that the parties can always negotiate an agreement in principle and a shorter timeframe for implementation, such as three months. The key is implementation because it is unrealistic to expect SF to â€œpay up frontâ€ with no guarantee of a deal. Ahern said the elements of a deal are clear, but it is important to keep all of the other parties involved as well. The last elections virtually eliminated the PUP and the Womenâ€™s Coalition; the Alliance Party is significantly weakened; and SDLP and the UUP could lose all their Westminster seats in the next general election (to SF and DUP).
Â¶4. (C) Ahern said SF and the DUP cannot be allowed to hold up the entire devolution process indefinitely. He noted that Blair,s October 2002 &Acts of Completion8 speech in Belfast failed spectacularly to bolster moderate unionism and the DUP continues to gain at UUPâ€™s expense. The question is how to pressure the DUP to deal? Ahern said two points were certain: SF canâ€™t be excluded from a deal, and it must be done within the parameters of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). Without it, nationalist voters will walk away, and the NI public generally will grow more skeptical of devolution. For this reason, of the plan B proposals being circulated, the SDLP,s proposal or some variation &is not a bad one.8 (Note: SDLP recently proposed that the two governments (London and Dublin) nominate 10 administrators for the 10 government departments in order to get some form of devolved government up and running. End note.)
Â¶5. (C) Reiss said the U.S. agreed there are merits to the SDLP,s proposal. Moreover, the threat of a viable plan B might be a useful inducement to get the parties to deal in September. Reiss asked what Dublin and London were doing to prepare the ground for September and offered to send Ahern some thoughts on this soon. Ahern said there were better prospects for success in September if the parties were working off one text that ring-fenced areas of agreement and bracketed the major remaining unresolved issues: fulfilling commitments under the Joint Declaration, the Finucane inquiry, On The Runs (OTRs), and release of the murderers of Garda Gerry McCabe. Reiss asked whether the Finucane case was a potential deal breaker. Ahern said it is not a republican, but a nationalist, issue. Because there is such broad-based support across the nationalist community in the North for an inquiry, SF will insist on it. Ahern added that the results of a Finucane inquiry report tomorrow would not surprise anyone and â€œTony (Blair) knows what he has to do.â€ (Comment: Presumably, that the PM will have to overrule elements of the security-legal establishments to see that some form of public inquiry is held. End comment.)
Â¶6. (C) Taioseach advisor XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SF knows there can be no deal without decommissioning - â€œeveryone knows what needs to be done.â€ Ahern added that another secret decommissioning act will not work; SF must understand that without transparency it will get no credit from DUP leader Paisley. Ahern noted that a clergyman in contact with Adams XXXXXXXXXXXX might act as a witness. His participation might be seen by unionists as lending credibility. Ahern said that the way to get SF on the policing boards is a deal that devolves policing/justice relatively quickly in exchange for an end to paramilitary activity and complete decommissioning. But, he added, DUP does not yet understand this. Reiss said that he would reinforce this when he met with DUP leaders on July 28.
MEETING WITH FM COWEN: GOI READY FOR FULL COURT PRESS IN SEPTEMBER
------------------------------------
Â¶7. (C) Reiss subsequently met with Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen, who was accompanied by XXXXXXXXXXXX. Cowen said that, even though DUP leader Paisley wants to do a deal, the main worry going into the September talks is that the parties will delay an agreement to get a better deal: â€œthis is why we discuss plan Bs.â€ Cowen added that, nonetheless, the GOI is going into September â€œwith all guns blazing.â€ Reiss asked what will the market bear in terms of pain to the parties. That is, he suggested that the parties discuss a plan B publicly and privately to pressure both the DUP and SF. Reiss added that SF-DUP dialogue over the next two months approaching September is critical and asked whether a &stick and carrot8 approach to Sinn Fein (SF) might be adopted and result in forward motion. XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that it is difficult to find a stick that wonâ€™t alienate SF and destabilize/set back the entire process. Cowen reiterated PM Ahernâ€™s endorsement that talks in September focus around a bracketed text.
Â¶8. (C) Cowen said that the key factor at present is the DUP willingness to pre-cook a deal. This should allow SF to seriously engage, get an agreement, and then proceed with sequencing. In terms of offering a carrot, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the DUP needs to feel &flattered.8 He noted that party members are visiting the Kennedy School of Government in Harvard during the month of July, and it may be opportune to invite them to Washington for consultations and to drive home the message that the opportunity for a deal is there. Cowen said that the DUP must understand that changes on Strand One of the GFA would need to be offset by changes to Strand Two. He added that the issue of First Minister and Deputy First Minister must be resolved sooner rather than later. On decommissioning, Cowen suggested that one way to get transparency without breaching confidentiality would be to publish retrospectively the index listing a full inventory of guns and explosives following total decommissioning.
Â¶9. (C) Reiss asked how firm was the DUPâ€™s demand for a six-month &decontamination8 period prior to SF taking seats at the Executive table. Cowen replied that 6 months is a negotiating position, and â€œin fairnessâ€ DUP is ready to do a â€œbig bangâ€ deal now. Cowen noted that the devolution of justice is a critical issue for SF, and Finucane is a potential deal breaker -- it is a &hot button topic8 that is not going to go away. KENNY

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:19 PM

Vzczcxro2027
pp ruehfl ruehkw ruehla ruehrov ruehsr
de ruehdl #0556/01 2831021
zny ccccc zzh
p 091021z oct 08
fm amembassy dublin
to ruehc/secstate washdc priority 9491
info ruehzl/european political collective priority
ruehbl/amconsul belfast priority 0806

thursday, 09 october 2008, 10:21
c o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 02 dublin 000556
sipdis
eo 12958 decl: 10/09/2018
tags efin, econ, prel, pgov, ei
subject: The bank guarantee: An irish solution to an irish
problem
dublin 00000556 001.2 of 002
classified by: Pol/econ chief theodore s. Pierce. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
â¶1. (c) summary: On september 29, the irish government announced plans to back deposits in all irish-domiciled banks. Foreign banks with significant irish operations were initially left out of the scheme but some look now to be included. Irish government officials maintain that impaired assets at irish banks are still relatively insignificant and are mostly confined to commercial property loans. They say that regulatory oversight of the financial sector will be tightened and that the drying up of credit to irish banks forced the decision to guarantee all deposits. The crush on irish banks could not have come at a worse time -- immediately preceding next weekâ€™s presentation of what is widely expected as the most austere government budget in years. End summary.
A crisis unfolds
----------------
â¶2. (u) following a late-night september 29 meeting with leading bankers -- central bank governor john hurley and chief executive of the financial regulator pat neary -- prime minister brian cowen took the decision to guarantee the deposits, loans, and obligations of the six irish-owned banks for two years. The next day finance minister brian lenihan and hurley briefed their key european counterparts. During a marathon session (almost 22 hours, a record) on october 1, the irish parliament passed legislation that would make the guarantee operational. On october 2, president mary mcaleese signed the credit institutions (financial support) bill 2008 into law. On october 6, lenihan faced questions about the scheme from other eu finance minister at an ecofin meeting in brussels and the central bank and the regulatory authority met to finalize the terms of the plan. On october 8, the irish cabinet met to discuss the plan but delayed announcing anything until the eu gives its formal approval, which is widely expected to happen early next week.
A perfect storm
---------------
â¶3. (c) econoff and visiting eur/we desk officer met with central bank and financial services authority officials gordon barham, maria woods, and billy clarke on october 6 to talk about the governmentâ€™s bank guarantee plan. Clarke said that the regulator had been carefully watching the banking sector as the months-long credit contraction unfolded. Explaining the seemingly sudden pressure on irish banks last week, he said a â€œperfect stormâ€ of external events related to the credit crisis had dried up the traditional sources of financing for irish financial institutions. Barham maintained that the level of impaired assets in the system stood at between 0.5 and 0.8 percent and these are mostly confined to loans to commercial property developers. When pressed, barham said the media had exaggerated the level of problem assets and those that existed could be managed.
â¶4. (c) clarke hesitated to make predictions but said that it is â€œlikelyâ€ the regulatory system would move from one that relied heavily on bank management working within broad guidelines laid down by the regulator to a â€œrules-basedâ€ one. An example he gave was that the regulator may be given the authority to limit the percentage of the banksâ€™ loan books that are extended to any one sector (i.e. Commercial or residential property). Barham and clarke said that the banks would not be allowed to securitize and sell impaired assets under this scheme. Rather, the banks, the regulator, and other government agencies would have to figure out how to â€œunwind the problem assets without exposing the irish taxpayer to undue risk.â€
â¶5. (c) econoff spoke with kevin cardiff, second secretary general at the department of finance, who has been deeply involved in putting together the guarantee package. Cardiff echoed the regulator and pointed out that auditors contracted by his department to look at the books of at least two of the institutions under pressure came away with â€œa favorable impression of the loan books.â€ while he admitted that the amount of â€œspeculative loans, or those that are not currently productive, is not insignificant,â€ he stressed that all involved in putting together the package were confident that the government would not be forced to bail out the banks.
â¶6. (c) cardiff said that credit to the irish banks â€œvirtually dried upâ€ on september 29 and that the government had to step in to salvage the irish financial sector. The genesis of this was classic â€œherd mentalityâ€ based mostly on rumor and innuendo about irish banks rather than any hard facts. However, fighting the herd became impossible, he added. He added that non-irish institutions with significant irish
dublin 00000556 002.2 of 002
operationsxxxxxxxxxxxx would likely be included in the scheme. Xxxxxxxxxxxx
â¶7. (c) although the move did not win any friends across europe, cardiff said that there is a gradual realization in brussels that each country should be allowed to tailor its response to local conditions. He characterized the irish governmentâ€™s discussion with eu officials as â€œpositiveâ€ and indicated that the irish solution would soon gain approval. In an aside, he pointed out that irish finance minister brian lenihan and his british counterpart, alistair darling, had engaged in a very constructive exchange of views. Cardiff continued that the prevailing mood in europe is that â€œlarge-scale failures just make things worseâ€ and that he expected more irish-like solutions. He warned, though, that the battle had just begun.
Comment
-------
â¶8. (c) against the background of a steep slump in the property market and anecdotal evidence we have picked up, it may be that government officials are being a bit optimistic in their assessment of the level of impaired assets. It begs the question: If the level of impaired assets is not a problem, why the sudden pressure on irish banks? Perhaps the perfect storm answer is the right one. Whatever the answer, the irish government has its work cut out for it as it works with the private sector to stop the bleeding and then rebuild the irish financial sector. With the government maintaining that the irish banking sector nearly collapsed during the past two weeks and the announcement of what is expected to be a very draconian 2009 government budget next week, irish economic policymakers are facing their most significant challenge in decades. Foley

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:21 PM

Friday, 04 February 2005, 16:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000143
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/04/2015
TAGS PREL, PTER, PINR, EI, UK, NIPP
SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS: GOI SHAKEN BY SECOND IRA STATEMENT
BUT FAVORS â€œINCLUSIONâ€
Classified By: AMB JAMES C. KENNY

Â¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Amb Kenny met February 4 with XXXXXXXXXXXX. The ambassador indicated that the USG is inclined not to invite Northern Ireland political parties to the March 17 White House event. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI believes engagement with Sinn Fein is better than exclusion, and asked if the USG would be willing to defer a decision in case the environment improves. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI strategy regarding the peace process was to â€œsit tightâ€ and let Sinn Fein find its way back in, following strong messages from the GOI and UK to Sinn Fein leaders. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the second IRA statement made the situation worse. He said the GOI considered the February 3 IRA statement â€œominousâ€ and was â€œunnervedâ€ by it. In response to the ambassadorâ€™s request for more information on the bank robbery, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI information came mostly from the UK and from PSNI-Garda contacts, a point reinforced later on February 4 in a telephone conversation from XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the GOI has a â€œvery strong viewâ€ that Sinn Fein should not be excluded from the United States, which he wishes to discuss in person with the Ambassador at their XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify on the phone whether he was expressing a general view on visas for Sinn Fein or a specific view on March 17 events.) Separately this week, POL/ECON chief met with political figures active in the peace process, all of whom echoed some of XXXXXXXXXXXX concerns: uncertainty over whether Sinn Fein is serious about peace, whether it can bring the IRA along or would be willing to break from the IRA, and uncertainty over whether Sinn Fein is in full control of the IRA. Interlocutors also commented on the domestic political implications of the current impasse. DCM and POL/ECON Chief also attended the meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary.
March 17
--------
Â¶2. (S) On XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ambassador Kenny briefed XXXXXXXXXXXXon current USG thinking about the March 17 events, emphasizing that the most important aspect of the occasion is the Presidentâ€™s meeting with the Taoiseach (PM Ahern). He told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the USG at this point is inclined not to invite any of the Northern Ireland parties to the White House but instead to honor civic leaders. When asked for GOI views, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that it was of course a USG decision to make but it was a decision that would have ramifications in Ireland. He said that the situation is â€œtenseâ€ and the GOI does not want it to worsen. The GOI feels that engagement with Sinn Fein is better than exclusion. Noting that the situation is fluid, he said that the Taoiseach would prefer that no decision be made, yet, on White House participation. XXXXXXXXXXXX seemed especially concerned that no decision be announced next week, given that the week will already be highly charged because of the release of the International Independent Monitoring Commissionâ€™s report on the Northern Bank robbery. The discussion then turned to Sinn Feinâ€™s visa requests for events in the U.S. around St. Patrickâ€™s Day, apart from the White House. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated the GOIâ€™s strong view that giving Sinn Fein visas to the U.S. helps the peace process.
IRA Statements of February 2 and 3
----------------------------------
Â¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the long IRA statement of February 2 had not worried the GOI because it seemed natural for the IRA to take its decommissioning offer off the table given the abeyance in the peace process. However, he said the February 3 statement had caught them by surprise. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI believed the two statements were written by different drafters. The February 3 statement, he said, looked like the style of the Chief of Staff of the IRA. He called the statement â€œominousâ€ and said it had left GOI officials â€œunnerved and anxious.â€ He then referred to Sinn Feinâ€™s Martin McGuinnessâ€™ claim of also having no prior knowledge of the statement. He said that if McGuinness genuinely did not know in advance that the IRA would issue a second statement February 3, that could signal that Sinn Fein is genuinely breaking from the IRA. While that might indicate Sinn Feinâ€™s seriousness about pursuing peace, it would raise other issues. Was Sinn Fein losing control over the IRA? If Sinn Fein no longer can or will serve as a conduit to the IRA, who will? XXXXXXXXXXXX then noted that McGuinness did not repudiate the IRA statement, which he implied would tend to indicate no change in Sinn Feinâ€™s relationship with the IRA.
Â¶4. (C) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX uncertainty about Sinn Feinâ€™s intentions and Sinn Feinâ€™s control over the IRA were echoed in comments across the political spectrum this week, including in conversations with Senator Martin Mansergh, former government advisor on Northern Ireland; staff from the Glencree Center for reconciliation; and a Fianna Fail political advisor. That XXXXXXXXXXXX and others so long and deeply engaged in the peace process would be so uncertain of Sinn Feinâ€™s intentions is not a good omen for the peace process. It indicates the degree to which the bank robbery destroyed the governmentâ€™s trust in Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, uncertainty about Sinn Feinâ€™s interest in peace or control over the IRA, combined with the IRAâ€™s February 3 statement, clearly has officials worried. The government steadfastly holds onto engagement with Sinn Fein because it sees no other alternative. End Comment
Peace Process
-------------
Â¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the GOIâ€™s approach to the peace process was to â€œsit tightâ€ and let Sinn Fein find its way back. Equally, the GOI will stay engaged with Sinn Fein, including a February 4 meeting between FM Dermott Ahern and Martin McGuinness, Sinn Feinâ€™s chief negotiator. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that until the bank robbery, there was every expectation that a comprehensive agreement would be reached. He said the two outstanding issues, decommissioning and criminality, had been considered resolvable until the bank robbery -- which he termed a â€œtragedy that stopped everything.â€ Senator Martin Mansergh, who remains influential in the peace process and close to the Taoiseach, was more expansive. He said that Sinn Fein must get the message to draw a line under paramilitarism and criminality. Echoing what we have also heard from DFA, Mansergh said that since the robbery, there is no longer any willingness to accept Sinn Feinâ€™s argument that it needs time to bring the IRA along. Like other contacts, Mansergh said that ten years is long enough and this time, all around talks can only begin on the basis of the IRA winding up. Neither Mansergh nor any government official has yet defined what they would need from Sinn Fein. They say that they will not again work on a comprehensive package only to have it fall apart at the end because of the IRA yet also say they would not expect decommissioning and a cessation of criminality to be a pre-requisite to all party talks.
GOI Information on the Northern Bank Robbery
--------------------------------------------
Â¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the GOIâ€™s judgment on the robbery was based almost exclusively on UK intelligence. He also said that intelligence is handled very differently in the British and Irish governments. In the Irish government, many officials, including himself, do not receive any intelligence reports. The tradition instead is to take the word of the Garda. Later on February 4, at XXXXXXXXXXXXâ€™ request, XXXXXXXXXXXX called the ambassador. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he would be more precise with the Ambassador during their scheduled February 8 meeting, but confirmed that UK and PSNI information, combined with Irelandâ€™s long experience with the IRA, was the basis for the GOI assessment that IRA was behind the robbery. He said the GOI has no smoking gun or hard evidence but that the GOI considered it 99% certain that IRA conducted the robbery. Among several reasons, he said that no group other than IRA could have entered the neighborhood in which the bank manager lived. He described it as a â€œno goâ€ area for the PSNI and splinter groups. He also said no other group would have the discipline, this many weeks after the robbery, not to try to use a bank note, or provide information on the van or any other aspect of the robbery. He said that the GOI does have â€œrock solid evidenceâ€ that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness are members of the IRA military command and for that reason, the Taoiseach is certain they would have known in advance of the robbery.
Domestic Implications
---------------------
Â¶7. (C) The GOIâ€™s all-out verbal offensive against Sinn Fein has tongues wagging about domestic politics. Martin Mansergh volunteered that as much as the Taoiseach is thinking about the 2007 elections, he values the peace process more and would sacrifice political gain if he thought peace would be advanced. Mansergh told POL/ECON chief that the bank robbery has damaged Sinn Fein in the Republic. While not yet reflected in poll numbers, Mansergh and other political operatives, believe (or hope) that some Sinn Fein voters will go elsewhere now that it is clear that Sinn Fein can not become part of any government in the Republic as long as IRA activity continues. On radio, Mansergh made the point more colorfully: â€œThe truth is that Sinn Fein, regardless of extra seats they might or mightnâ€™t win, wouldnâ€™t come within an assesâ€™ roar of power north or south of the Border until the IRA is off the pitch.â€ 8. (C) Another idea sporadically under consideration is that Fianna Fail could start competing in elections in Northern Ireland. The argument is that Fianna Failâ€™s best way of confronting Sinn Fein in the Republic is to become an all-island party. Some think doing so could also give nationalists in the north an alternative to Sinn Fein, given the SDLPâ€™s waning fortunes. Mansergh did not see this as a short term prospect, in part because the SDLP has not yet indicated an interest in merging with Fianna Fail. Derek Mooney, Fianna Failâ€™s political advisor to the Defense Minister, says the opposite. He said the bank robbery is rapidly changing the prospective and it is the right time for Fianna Fail to move north. He noted that most of SDLPâ€™s former voters are not voting at all, and only a small percentage shifted to Sinn Fein. This, he said, leaves space for a nationalist party with a vision for the future, a space Mooney thinks SDLP will never re-gain because it is seen only as a peace process party. Mooney said Fianna Fail took a significant step in November 2004 when it changed its rules, allowing full membership for people not resident in the Republic. The rules also allow a person to be a member of both Fianna Fail and SDLP. Mooney provides campaign advice to SDLP. KENNY

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:22 PM

Tuesday, 08 March 2005, 14:11
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000286
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, SOCI
SUBJECT: IRELAND: FINANCE MINISTER COWEN ON THE NORTH,
MONEY LAUNDERING, AND HIGHER EDUCATION
REF: DUBLIN 210
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Â¶1. (C) Summary. In a brief March 7 meeting with Finance Minister Brian Cowen, the Ambassador recommended U.S.-style tax incentives for university endowment contributions as a model for Ireland in addressing funding shortfalls for higher education. Cowen noted Irelandâ€™s drive on economic and academic competitiveness and said that the GOI could consider the endowment idea as part of ongoing comprehensive review of the Irish tax code. On Northern Ireland, Cowen said that a strong message from the U.S. Congress to Sinn Fein could help to advance a final resolution in the peace proces, as would Congressional hearings on criminality. Cowen also noted that Sinn Fein seems to be playing a â€œdouble gameâ€ -- taking a hard public line against criminality, but avoiding definitive action in order to retain maneuverability for final negotiations with unionists. The Minister also pointed out that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was taking the GOI lead on investigations into the apparent money-laundering scheme uncovered on February 17-18, and he offered to arrange a DOJ briefing for the Embassy on the status of the investigations. End summary.
Â¶2. (U) On March 7, the Ambassador held a brief, cordial meeting with Finance Minister Brian Cowen.XXXXXXXXXXXX also attended, along with XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Econoff was Embassy notetaker.
Higher Education Funding
------------------------
Â¶3. (C) The Ambassador related concerns expressed by U.S. firms and Irish universities that the quality and number of third-level graduates (roughly 16,000 in 2004) increasingly appeared insufficient to meet the needs of Irelandâ€™s hi-tech economic sectors. The Ambassador noted that this problem had repercussions for Irelandâ€™s drive on global competitiveness and was linked to limits on education funding, which derived from the Governmentâ€™s long-standing decision not to impose university tuition for Irish students (a theme of the Ambassadorâ€™s March 3 speech at Trinity College). He cited the case of E-Bay, which had established offices in Ireland in 2004, but which was now several hundred employees behind in its hiring schedule because of qualification deficiencies among job applicants. With the reimposition of tuition fees off the table, said the Ambassador, an alternative funding mechanism for Irish higher education could be U.S.-style university endowments. Importantly, U.S. tax law encouraged individual and corporate donations to an endowment by making them tax-deductible. The Ambassador asked whether the U.S. endowment model might hold interest for the Department of Finance and also whether private contributions to university endowments were now, or could become, tax-deductible.
Â¶4. (SBU) Cowen thanked the Ambassador for his interest and cited the Governmentâ€™s focus on competition, both at the university level and for the Irish economy writ-large. Cowen said that, in the Governmentâ€™s drive to improve university education, the Department of Finance had concentrated on assisting the transition to better management structures in university administration. This effort entailed rationalizing curricula, faculty, and academic departments so as to eliminate obscure, under-attended courses with a view to making the most good for the most students. The extra motivation for the Finance Departmentâ€™s efforts with the universities had come primarily from an OECD report in 2004 on Irish higher education, which claimed that Ireland was risking its global economic competitiveness without more extensive education reforms. He added that whereas endowments had not previously played a major role in education funding in Ireland, this was an idea that the Government might do well to consider, especially with the unlikely reimposition of tuition fees.
Â¶5. (C) Cowen confirmed that private/corporate donations to education endowments were currently not tax-deductible, a reflection of the fact that corporate and personal tax rates were already comparatively low. He added, however, that the Finance Department was conducting a comprehensive review of breaks/incentives in the Irish tax code and that endowment contributions could be examined in that context. To introduce tax write-offs for endowment donations, it would be necessary, said Cowen, to ensure that funds otherwise destined for government coffers would not simply be switched to the endowments. Second, the tax incentives for contributions would have to be designed to discourage contributors from dictating to the universities the way that their donations could be used, e.g., only for cancer research. Cowen observed that failure on this second point could allow contributors too powerful a voice in the design of student curricula. He noted that, with the surge in the number of wealthy Irish, there could be win-win situations for the universities in terms of funding resources and for contributors in terms of their tax burden. He said the Finance Department would welcome any additional U.S. perspectives on the endowment idea that the Ambassador might wish to offer.
Northern Ireland; Money Laundering
----------------------------------
Â¶6. (C) On the Northern Ireland peace process, Cowen expected that Sinn Fein would â€œgo off to sort itself outâ€ following the partyâ€™s annual conference on March 4-6 in Dublin. He believed that, after the May Westminster elections, Sinn Fein would attempt to convince people of its seriousness about criminality through actions designed to back up the partyâ€™s recent positive rhetoric on the subject. Cowen related his impression that Gerry Adams was playing a â€œdouble gameâ€ -- taking a hard public line against criminality, but avoiding definitive action in order to retain maneuverability for final negotiations with unionists. Cowen thought the family of murder victim Robert McCartney had done a valuable public service in exposing this form of equivocation. The Minister also expressed hope that the U.S. Congress would deliver a strong message to Sinn Fein over St. Patrickâ€™s Day on the need for a final resolution in Northern Ireland, especially with the IRA cease-fire now more than ten years old. A series of Congressional hearings on Northern Ireland focusing on the criminality question would, maintained Cowen, help to bring political pressure on Sinn Fein to take the necessary steps in pursuit of a final deal.
Â¶7. (C) When the Ambassador asked for an update on the GOI money-laundering investigation into the February 17-18 police seizures of roughly euro 4 million in sterling notes (reftel), Minster Cowen replied that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was the GOI lead on the case. He said, however, that the Department of Finance was as intensely interested in GOI progress as the Embassy, and he offered to arrange a DOJ confidential briefing for the Embassy on the investigations. Cowen noted that the briefing could include a supplement from the Ireland Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA, a component of the Irish Central Bank). He added that IFSRA had not reported any problems to date in pursuing the case in the context of its relatively new regulatory powers under the â€œCentral Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act, 2003.â€
KENNY

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:27 PM

123
Â¶1. (C) Summary: The November 14-15 visit of U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow was an opportunity for discussion on
SIPDIS the â€œsecretsâ€ of Ireland,s success with policy-makers and businessmen who were the architects of Ireland,s Celtic Tiger economy. These key figures noted that while the concepts behind Ireland,s reforms had been simple, the political will to carry out the reforms had only come in the context of an economic meltdown in the mid-1980s. They said that good-faith relations with labor, investment in education, and a â€œdictatorialâ€ leadership that exposed industries to the full discipline of the market had been key to success. Ireland,s skill in securing substantial EU support funds and in exploiting U.S. policy on corporate tax deferral was another important factor in Ireland,s economic turnaround. Looking ahead, the policy-makers cited both the need to ensure Ireland,s continued competitiveness as a magnet for foreign direct investment and also the role of education in shaping Ireland as an innovation-based, higher-value economy. Secretary Snow,s classroom discussion at Dublin City University (DCU) highlighted the role of higher education in promoting innovation and entrepreneurship. End summary.
------------
Introduction
------------
Â¶2. (U) The November 14-15 visit of U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow was an opportunity for substantive discussion on the â€œsecretsâ€ of Ireland,s economic success. During a dinner hosted by the Ambassador and a lunch arranged by the Ulster Bank, Secretary Snow spoke with 16 policy-makers and businessmen (listed in para 12) who were instrumental in the emergence of the Celtic Tiger economy. A breakfast with the American Chamber of Commerce and a classroom exchange at Dublin City University (DCU) reinforced the points made by these key figures. The following are the principal insights that emerged from Secretary Snow,s visit (which are organized thematically, not in the sequential order in which they were discussed).
--------------------------------------------- --------
In the Beginning: Political Will and Industrial Peace
--------------------------------------------- --------
Â¶3. (C) Although the concepts behind Ireland,s reforms had been simple, the political will to carry out the reforms had only come in the context of the mid-1980s, economic meltdown, said Padraig O,hUiginn, former Secretary General in the Office of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). O,hUiginn recalled drafting a proposal for economic recovery during that era, using ideas that were â€œapparent to any first-year economics graduate studentâ€ ) cut the fiscal deficit, spur competition, lower corporate taxes, etc. The ruling party at the time, Fine Gael, did not act on the proposal, but the Fianna Fail government elected in 1987 made the document the basis for the Program of National Recovery (PNR), which set forth the policies that underpinned Ireland,s economic turnaround. Fianna Fail,s â€œgreat advantageâ€ at the time, said O,hUiginn, was Ireland,s economic crisis; with 18 percent unemployment and government debt at 130 percent of GDP, the political opposition, industry, and labor could not afford politically to impede solutions. The PNR,s linchpin was labor,s decision to accept a moderate wage increases in exchange for income tax relief, which became the basic approach to successive national wage-setting (Social Partnership) agreements. O,hUiginn recounted that the Government offered Irish pounds 700 million in tax relief in 1987 and also cut the fiscal deficit, forcing the closure of several hospitals and the retrenchment of 16,000 civil servants. He noted that the moderate wage increase incorporated in the PNR laid the foundation for Ireland,s competitiveness as an export platform and as a draw for foreign direct investment (FDI).
Â¶4. (C) The Government,s good-faith dealings with unions in negotiating Social Partnership agreements were, and remained, central to Ireland,s economic success, said Peter Cassells, former General Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. According to Cassells, a shared understanding between unions and the Government on the importance of decent wages and housing for workers was the basis of labor,s commitment to the Social Partnership approach. He added that the transparency and inclusiveness of wage-setting negotiations, in which even the most disgruntled union representatives were given voice, were also instrumental to success. The typical industrial relations model in which union chiefs and politicians hammered out back-room agreements, in the mode of Lyndon Johnson and Lane Kirkland, would not have secured labor buy-in to economic reforms, Cassells asserted. He further observed that the Social Partnership approach might not be replicable in other EU Member States, which typically were more populous than Ireland and had more diffuse union structures.
----------------------
The Key: Human Capital
----------------------
Â¶5. (C) The chief source of Ireland,s success has been its educated labor force, said EU Commissioner-designate and former Irish Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy. He noted that the introduction of free primary and secondary education in the 1960-70s initially benefited other countries as much as Ireland, due to the emigration of educated Irish workers. As a young parliamentarian, moreover, McCreevy had warned that the 1970s, baby boom was a looming disaster, on the pretext that Ireland,s small, weak economy could not accommodate a future surge in labor, even with emigration. As it turned out, this large pool of young, educated workers became Ireland,s principal resource and the main attraction for foreign multinationals to establish subsidiaries in the country. Far from a disaster, the period 1987-2003 saw the addition of 600,000 jobs to the economy and drop in the unemployment rate from 18 percent to 4 percent. This success, concluded McCreevy, was primarily attributable to Ireland,s investment in human capital.
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â€œDictatorialâ€ Leadership
------------------------
Â¶6. (C) The implementation of reforms that underpinned Ireland,s economic recovery had required â€œdictatorialâ€ leadership, said McCreevy. This involved incenitivizing industries to achieve efficiencies by exposing them to the full discipline of the market, even at the risk of bankruptcies. The challenge in this approach, explained McCreevy, was to press ahead with reforms in the face of elections, which provided temptations for politicians to adopt softer, more populist economic platforms. Secretary Snow observed that whereas the gains from economic reforms in any country tended to be diffuse, the losses were often concentrated in particular sectors or geographic areas, making it easier for those affected to organize political opposition. McCreevy commented that the test of any government was how well it explained to dislocated workers that the reforms responsible for their plight were good for the country. Indecon Economic Consultants CEO Alan Gray separately pointed out that Ireland had succeeded, through education, in giving workers the skills to move across industries, to the point now where those laid off did not ask, â€œDo I have any hope of a job?â€ but rather â€œWhich one of my new employment choices should I take?â€
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EU Help
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Â¶7. (C) EU tools, primarily structural support funds, were another factor in the emergence of Ireland,s Celtic Tiger economy, explained former Prime Minister (1992-95) Albert Reynolds and Ray McSharry, former EU Commissioner and Irish Finance Minister. Reynolds said that the Irish Government did not shy from viewing such tools as entitlements, since Ireland, as an island nation, faced additional challenges trading within the European Community. He and McSharry recalled that Ireland had negotiated well to maximize the level of EU support. For example, Reynolds claimed that he had obtained over euro one billion from Brussels as a result of a discussion with Chancellor Kohl in which Reynolds agreed to support Germany,s push for rapid EU enlargement. EU Commissioner-designate McCreevy separately echoed Reynolds, points, saying that French Finance Minister Sarkozy,s proposal to reduce EU support for new Member States that applied low corporate tax rates was shortsighted. McCreevy said that any EU measures to increase growth in the new Member States would redound to the benefit of the entire EU.
---------------------------
U.S. Policy on Tax Deferral
---------------------------
Â¶8. (C) The U.S. policy of tax deferral for foreign subsidiaries of American firms, combined with Ireland,s 12.5 percent corporate tax rate, underpinned the large influx of U.S. investment to Ireland during the Celtic Tiger period, observed Padraic White, former CEO of Ireland,s Industrial Development Authority (IDA). White recounted his numerous trips to the U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee to defend tax deferral, and he argued that Senator Kerry,s plan to reverse tax deferral would have â€œkilled Ireland,â€ had he been elected. White believed that complaints by the U.S. public about the job outsourcing that accompanied U.S. investment flows were wrong-headed. U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland, he argued, were the principle reason that the United States had penetrated the personal computer, software, and pharmaceutical markets in Europe. He further observed that under-performing U.S. companies were typically those that had not attempted to expand overseas. Secretary Snow concurred that U.S. companies that were outsourcing overseas were those creating the most jobs in the United States. He highlighted, however, the political difficulty of explaining outsourcing to the U.S. public, recalling slogans during the recent election campaign that criticized â€œBenedict Arnold CEOs.â€
------------------------------------------
A Propitious Lack of Monetary Policy Tools
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Â¶9. (C) An ironic feature of Ireland,s success has been the Government,s lack of monetary policy tools, remarked Cormack McCarthy, Chief Executive of the Ulster Bank. One might think that a country that had performed so well in terms of exports and investment would have relied heavily on interest rate and exchange rate levers, said McCarthy. As a euro-zone member, in fact, Ireland had ceded control of its monetary policy to the European Central Bank. The positive result, said McCarthy, were low interest rates. He believed that if Ireland had remained control of monetary policy, the Government would have been tempted to raise interest rates to slow rapid growth in the late 1990s. Instead, the low rates set by the ECB had been a boon to Ireland,s private sector and had lent a sense of stability and consistency to the Irish market for foreign investors.
--------------------------------------------
Looking Ahead: Competitiveness and Education
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Â¶10. (C) Looking ahead, the principal danger for Ireland is complacency, said Eoin O,Driscoll, Chairman of Forfas (the Government think-tank) and the Government-commissioned Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG). Echoing the ESG,s recently published findings, O,Driscoll cited the need to ensure Ireland,s continued competitiveness as a magnet for foreign direct investment (FDI), which, he said, had driven the country,s economic transformation. (U.S. and Irish businesspersons who attended the November 15 American Chamber of Commerce breakfast with Secretary Snow made similar points, noting that multinationals were increasingly attracted by low-cost manufacturing opportunities in China and India.) O,Driscoll said that, just as industry and Government had collaborated in the 1990s to make Ireland a base for leading bio-pharmaceutical and IT companies, the country needed a new shared vision to go another rung higher in the production of innovative, high-value goods and services. He note that this challenge would involve marrying innovation to better business practices, particularly in sales and marketing, and he praised the U.S. model of perfecting product designs in the market, as opposed to the European preference of the laboratory. While Secretary Snow cautioned against government attempts to pick winners in the market, he ventured that the key to economic prosperity rested with countries like the United States that fostered a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship.
Â¶11. (U) Secretary Snow,s classroom discussion with students, professors, and administrators at Dublin City University (DCU) was a venue for further discussion on the role of innovation, entrepreneurship, and academia in strengthening the Irish economy. The event took place at DCU,s â€œInvent Center,â€ which serves as a business incubator for student entrepreneurs and community start-up companies. Secretary Snow highlighted the centrality of education and
SIPDIS intellectual capital to the modern, knowledge-based economy, and he explained that to embrace a market economy was to embrace ever-changing needs for new ideas and skills. He also noted the difficulties that economists had encountered in finding ways to capture creativity, â€œthat spark,â€ in modeling economic activity. DCU president Ferdinand von Prondzynski commented that the university had encountered a similar challenge, but espoused the belief that entrepreneurship could be taught, in the same way as poetry, painting, and other modes of creativity. Prondzynski also stressed that innovation meant little without business skills, and he cited DCU requirements for students to establish relationships Irish entrepreneurs who had both succeeded and failed in bringing new ideas to the market.
--------------------------------
Participants in the â€œArchitectâ€ Discussions with Secretary Snow
-------------------------------
Â¶12. (U) Participants in the Ambassador,s November 14 dinner for Secretary Snow were: Charlie McCreevy, EU Commissioner-designate and former Irish Finance Minister; Dermot Desmond, financier; Eoin O,Driscoll, Chairman of Forfas and the Enterprise Strategy Group; Padraig White, former CEO of the Industrial Development Authority; and Padraig O,huiginn, Former Secretary General in the Office of the Taoiseach. Attendees at the November 15 Ulster Bank lunch were: Ray McSharry, former EU Commisioner and Minister of Finance; Lochlann Quinn, co-founder of Glen Dimplex; Peter Cassells, former Secretary General of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions; Albert Reynolds, former Prime Minister (Taoiseach); Allan Gray, Chairman of Indecon Economic Consulting; Willie Walsh, CEO of Aer Lingus; Bill Harris, National Science Foundation Director; and Cormack McCarthy, David Pierce, and Michael Torpey of the Ulster Bank.
Â¶13. (U) This cable has been cleared by Treasury DAS Nancy Lee KENNY[/quote]

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:33 PM

Wednesday, 01 June 2005, 08:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUBLIN 000657
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINS, EI, UK, NIPP
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND
COMMITTED TO GFA
REF: LONDON 4254
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Part 1

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SUMMARY
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Â¶1. (C) During Special Envoy Mitchell Reissâ€™ visit to Ireland May 19-22, the Irish government emphasized that the Good Friday Agreement and the December 8 joint communique must be the basis for forward movement in the peace process. They anticipate an IRA response to Gerry Adamsâ€™ call to leave the scene within 60 days; they believe the focus must be kept on the IRA but do not have a specific list of steps the IRA must take as pre-conditions to serious negotiations. They believe serious talks will begin in September, but it could take until early 2006 to put the pieces in place, especially since the DUP would require a long period to verify IRA good behavior. GOI officials uniformly expressed concern that the UKâ€™s political interest in showing progress might lead the UK to be too soft on Sinn Fein. Other issues raised include Irish unhappiness with the UKâ€™s inquiry into the Finucane murder; the importance of a non-violent marching season in Northern Ireland; and concerns about IRA criminality. Reiss briefed on his meetings in London and Belfast and informed them of the USGâ€™s decision to refuse a visa to Sinn Fein member Rita Oâ€™Hare.
Â¶2. (U) Mitchell Reiss met with the Taoiseach, PM Bertie Ahern; Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, Justice Minister Michael McDowell; Finance Minister Brian Cowen; and, UK Ambassador Eldon. The Ambassador, DCM, POL/ECON Counselor, and S/P Special Assistant accompanied him to all meetings. Reiss and the Ambassador also had a private lunch with President and Dr. McAleese. END SUMMARY
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COMMENT
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Â¶3. (C) GOI concerns about UK â€œsoftnessâ€ represent a role reversal. Usually, it is the UK that is concerned Ireland will be too accommodating to Sinn Fein. The GOIâ€™s eventual position will depend on the Taoiseach. He is generally considered â€œsofterâ€ on the provisional movement than either the Foreign Affairs or Justice Ministers. However, he believes Sinn Fein leaders were aware of plans to rob the Northern Bank even as they negotiated with him last Fall. Publicly, he has been unprecedentedly critical of Sinn Fein and, until recently, greatly reduced private contacts as well. We are told that Adams prefers to deal directly with the Taoiseach and not with cabinet ministers. In deciding how to move forward, the Taoiseach is likely to look carefully at the IRAâ€™s response to Gerry Adams, given strong public feelings against IRA crime and paramilitarism. He is expected to call elections in 2007 or sooner. Having a deal in place would serve his political interests best; however, more failed attempts to reach a deal would hurt him electorally, particularly if he were seen to have been played by Sinn Fein. End Comment.
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TAOISEACH ADVISOR DESCRIBES GOI EXPECTATIONS
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Â¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX opened the meeting with an update of GOI actions. He said there had been very little GOI engagement with Sinn Fein since the talks broke down in December. He cited one meeting in January, one in March in Washington, and several private meetings between the Taoiseach and Gerry Adams. Significantly, he said the official feelings toward Sinn Fein had changed with all that has happened since December (Northern Bank robbery, money laundering, McCartney killing.) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI is interested in the Good Friday Agreement and not in any â€œlesser models or deals.â€ Following UK elections, the pace was picking up, he said, and he outlined a series of expected contacts with all parties. He said the GOI was pleased at PM Blairâ€™s re-election, and that Sinn Fein is aware that this is Blairâ€™s â€œlast lap.â€ That, he said, plays both ways. Sinn Fein knows that no successor is likely to be as engaged in the process as Blair, and that he represents their best hope of a deal. On the other hand, Sinn Fein also believes they could take advantage of Blairâ€™s interest in getting a deal before leaving office. Special Envoy Reiss, referring to his talks in London, said it is never good in a negotiation to appear more eager than the other side. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the UK had offered Sinn Fein a package following the December 8 breakdown, but withdrew it after the Northern Bank robbery. (Note: Sinn Fein has frequently expressed anger at the UK for â€œgoing back on its word.â€ While never specifically mentioning a post-December 8 package, during the negotiations, Sinn Fein seemed confident that the UK felt Sinn Feinâ€™s decommissioning offer was worth taking up even if a comprehensive deal with the DUP was not reached.)
...KEEP THE FOCUS ON THE IRA
Â¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated the focus must be kept on the IRA. The GOI, he said, hopes for decisive action, followed by a â€œproving periodâ€ and leading to talks that restore the executive. He anticipated that it might take until late fall or early in 2006 to put all the pieces together; the IRA would need to do something definitive within two months, and the DUP would likely require a six-month testing period before agreeing to sit down with Sinn Fein. XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is little appetite within the GOI or the Irish public for going â€œround and round again.â€ He said GOI will not go about talks in a â€œheadline way.â€ The credibility of the process and the players is in question, he said, and this time, talks must work. A deal is possible, he said, but will take time. Reiss responded by saying Gerry Adams had told him to expect an IRA response in a month, before the marching season. Reiss said Adams had stated that â€œthe IRA must be taken out of the equation.â€ Reiss noted that public tolerance of accepting things at face value is gone. The IMC must confirm that the IRA takes any actions it promises. When the Taoiseach joined the meeting, he said that verification would have to include witnesses of decommissiong (probably clergy), in addition to the IICD, as layed out December 8.
...QUIET MARCHING SEASON NECESSARY
Â¶6. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX Reiss and the Ambassador agreed that tensions were high as marching season approaches, and it is vitally important that violence is averted. That message needs to be delivered to all parties. The Ambassador asked who is engaging with the Parades Commission; XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is a disconnect between the Parades Commission and the PSNI. All agreed that a violent marching season could set back prospects for political progress.
...DUP FLEXING ITS MUSCLES, INCLUDING REGARDING POLICING BOARD
Â¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and Reiss exchanged views on the DUP, following their big win in UK elections. The Ambassador noted that DUP is looking to flex its muscles, and should not be allowed to unwind existing mechanisms, such as the Policing Board, whose mandate expires October 18. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed and said the GOI favors renewing the policing board in its current form.
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TAOISEACH DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD
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Â¶8. (C) The Taoiseach joined the meeting, and layed out his vision of the way forward. Like XXXXXXXXXXXX he felt any deal was many months away, with talks not starting until September and a deal not likely until January. The Taoiseach then discussed what he felt was realistic to expect from the IRA. He said that no one can expect the IRA to agree to disband; rather, it could enter a new commemorative role. His own father, he said, considered himself to be an IRA man to the day he died in the 1990â€™s. IRA members, he said, consider themselves to be soldiers and their IRA membership is the center of their lives. They could, however, convert to a commemorative organization that visits graves and plans events to mark the anniversaries of atrocities. The Taoiseach said he had explained this to DUP leader Ian Paisley. By the same token, the Taoiseach said Sinn Fein knows that they have milked the process as much as they can. He said that â€œGerry understands criminality must endâ€, even if he will not say that the IRA has been involved in crime.
Â¶9. (C) Reiss described changes in perception within the Irish-American community. Their conversations with the Taoiseach, and the IRAâ€™s words and actions following the McCartney murder were giving them a more realistic view of the IRA. The Taoiseach agreed, but noted that it is still hard for much of Irish-America to accept that the IRA was involved in the murder. Reiss then informed the Taoiseach that the US had refused Sinn Fein member Rita Oâ€™Hareâ€™s visa request.
...TAOISEACH RAISES FINUCANE
Â¶10. (C) The Taoiseach raised the Finucane case, as did every other GOI official with whom Reiss met. Reiss briefed him on his talks in London, including with the head of MI5, who committed to turning over all evidence her agency has to the inquiry, but she was adamant that the inquiry will proceed using the new legislation. Reiss noted his concern that the Finucane case will become an irritant in Irish relations with the UK and get in the way of a deal. The Taoiseach said that the entire parliament was united in opposition to the UK approach. Parliament does not believe the UK will give all evidence because, in its view, the UK did not cooperate fully with the Barron commissionâ€™s investigation into the 1974 Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The Taoiseach said that the GOI wants the UK to provide evidence acknowledging its involvement in Finucaneâ€™s murder and it wants to know how high in the UK government collusion went. He said if the UK were to provide the information, it would only grab the headlines for a few hours because â€œeveryone knows the UK was involved.â€ Other ministers made the same point and noted that the Taoiseach is particularly seized with the Finucane case and would have to personally approve any compromise to ease the dispute with the UK, such as Reissâ€™ suggestion of putting an Irish judge in charge of the inquiry.
--------------------------------------------- ---
FM ECHOES PM ON IRA, GFA, CONCERN ABOUT FINUCANE AND MARCHING SEASON
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....IRA
Â¶11. (C) FM Ahern said he liked Reissâ€™ public comments that the IRA should respond â€œsooner rather than later,â€ and he agreed with Reiss that the IRA statement must be clean, with no ambiguity, and that the three governments need to agree on what they want from the IRA. In the end, the DUP must also be on board in order for a deal to be struck. FM Ahern was adamant that the Irish government was interested in a comprehensive deal only, and was concerned that the UK might be open to Sinn Feinâ€™s desire to cut a side deal with London. He said that such talks between the UK and IRA were underway in December between the breakdown of talks and the Northern Bank robbery. Such a deal, he said, would have allowed Sinn Fein to barter decommissioning for concessions. Moreover, he said, a bilateral deal between the UK and Sinn Fein would polarize the situation in Northern Ireland.
...Sinn Fein
Â¶12. (C) FM Ahern said that Sinn Fein knows serious negotiations cannot begin unless trust is re-established. On the other hand, he said, maybe thatâ€™s not what they want. (Note: FM Ahern is here referencing the theory that Sinn Fein finds engaging in the peace process in its interest because it softens the image of the party and gives them photo opportunities with prime ministers. According to this theory, the process is in Sinn Feinâ€™s interest, but Sinn Fein is not actually interested in striking a deal.) FM Ahern also touched on the balance the GOI tries to strike in talking about and to Sinn Fein. He said PSNI and others told the GOI that its tough line on Sinn Fein since December had been helpful but no longer was, and they should â€œlighten up.â€ On the other hand, the GOI also is asked why it talks to Sinn Fein at all, given that the International Monitoring Commission reports that they are continuining their activities. He noted that it is difficult for the two prime ministers to say â€œnoâ€ when Gerry Adams asks for a meeting. He said Sinn Fein is insisting on working out details at the top level of government only. (COMMENT: This is tactically smart of Gerry Adams, especially if he, like others, sees the Taoiseach as less tough on republicans than the outspoken Justice Minister or quieter but equally firm Foreign Minister.)
...Parade Season
Â¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said intelligence sources were worried that malcontents were planning to disrupt the marching season. He noted that the DUP and Orange Order were â€œplaying gamesâ€ with the Parades Commission, and repeated the view that PSNI and the Parades Commission were not connecting well. He said the GOI is particularly worried about the â€œwalk backâ€ -- after the parades and drinking, when marchers and hangers on walk back through republican areas. Special Envoy Reiss said that a violent marching season would play into the hands of those who believe that only the IRA can protect Catholic communities.
...Finucane
Â¶14. (C) FM Ahern raised the Finucane case, saying categorically that the UK was not complying with its 2001 Weston Park commitments. He said the GOI has lived up to its obligations and begun investigations into several cases. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the UK had pushed through its new Inquiries Act and that the Finucane family would not cooperate on that basis. ...Policing Board

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:34 PM

Part 2

Â¶15. (C) Special Envoy Reiss noted that the Policing Board was set to expire on October 18, and asked for Irish views, including on whether there were policy consequences of choosing to â€œcontinueâ€ the board or to â€œreconstituteâ€ it. FM Ahern said he had spoken to Northern Ireland Secretary of State Peter Hain about the issue. He said the GOI favors continuing the board, but the DUP wants to reconstitute it. He asserted that the DUP has no legal right to demand reconstitution on the basis of its electoral gains. FM Ahern also said he had raised IRA crime with Peter Hain, especially in the context of cross border cooperation between the Irish Criminal Assets Bureau and the Northern Ireland equivalent.
...International Fund for Ireland (IFI)
Â¶16. (C) As he has done publicly, FM Ahern talked about the importance of continuing IFI activities and the need to maintain donations from other governments. He said it is increasingly difficult to tap EU peace and reconciliation funds. FM Ahern talked about the need to reorient the board toward reconciliation and policing, and noted the board was considering a five-year strategy, ending in closure. He asked for U.S. views. The Ambassador noted that supporters of Ireland in the U.S. understand that the Irelandâ€™s economic boom means that international contributions to IFI will end at some point. One difficulty, he said, is that unionists only recently have taken part, and will insist on getting their fair share of grants. Special Envoy Reiss said that the IFIâ€™s new ideas for policing are likely to be acceptable under U.S. law.
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Justice Minister McDowell focuses on the IRA
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Â¶17. (C) Justice Minister McDowell, always the hardest hitting of the Irish cabinet, opened the meeting by saying that the Good Friday Agreement presumed the IRA would go out of business and it is still in business seven years later. He said the provisional movement (as he refers to jointly to the IRA and Sinn Fein) regards its arms cache as an embarrassment. Its semtex and kalishnakovs do not serve any useful purpose, he said, and the provisionals do not want to leave weapons in the hands of dissidents. He said the provisionals consider their arms stash a political liability that undermines their claim to be pursuing their goals through peaceful means only.
Â¶18. (C) Minister McDowell believes the provisionals want to close down the hardware side of their operation but to stay in business to fund national and international programs. He also said that the provisionals give no indication of loosening their grip on national areas in Northern Ireland where PSNI does not go. For that reason, he noted, the provisionals want to hold on to personal weapons.
Â¶19. (C) McDowell said some lessons have been learned about how to deal with the provisional movement. McDowell said that you only get concessions from the provisionals when you put your hand on their throat. When you play their propaganda game, they press for concessions. McDowell said he was â€œdelightedâ€ that Sinn Fein was not invited to the White House on March 17. Looking forward, he said, the GOI was not in appeasement mode, and should offer a cold shoulder to the provisionals. Sinn Fein, he said, is â€œasking for warm wordsâ€ but governments should not offer them. He credited Sinn Fein with being â€œbrilliant negotiators.â€ They create eagerness and a sense of partnership, as if to say, â€œletâ€™s get together to sort out Sinn Fein problems.â€ What they cannot stand, he said, is skepticism. McDowell said he has warned Peter Hain against side deals with the provisionals, especially now that there is no center ground in Northern Ireland.
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Finance Minister Brian Cowen
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Â¶20. (C) In pursuing a political solution for Northern Ireland, the British and Irish Governments needed to address the economic dimension to the peace process, Finance Minister Brian Cowen told Ambassador Reiss in a May 20 meeting. Cowen cautioned against an approach that focused on establishing institutions of self-government, while neglecting equally urgent economic imperatives, such as improving social services and tacking unemployment. He expressed concern that HMG might wish to disengage from these challenges after a solution was reached. While the British Exchequer had made statements on the limits of UK financial support for the peace process, Cowen believed that HMG and the GOI could jointly foster a transition in Northern Ireland toward an economic system less dominated by the public sector. This cooperation could take the form of coordinating Irelandâ€™s National Spatial Strategy with the Northâ€™s development plans; there was also the possibility of harmonizing tax rates and key commodity prices to spur cross-border investment. Ambassador Reiss agreed that it was important to avoid scenarios where economic difficulties would continue to fuel social tensions even after a political resolution was in hand.
Â¶21. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/P. KENNY

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:37 PM

Wednesday, 27 July 2005, 16:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000936
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR POL AND LEGATT
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, EFIN, SOCI, KCRM, EI, NIPP
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON IRA MONEY-LAUNDERING INVESTIGATION
REF: A. STATE 104288
Â¶B. DUBLIN 210 C. SOFIA 1108
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Jonathan S. Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Â¶1. (C) Summary: Irish criminal justice officials are convinced that pound sterling notes seized in Dublin and Cork in mid-February in an apparent IRA-tied money-laundering scheme was money stolen from Belfastâ€™s Northern Bank. Police are attempting to establish forensic links between the seizures and robbery in order to bring charges by late 2005, with a court case to follow a year later. Irish investigators continue to pursue a possible Bulgarian link to the money-laundering scheme, but are reluctant to provide details on exchanges with Bulgarian counterparts. The Bulgarian Ambassador in Dublin denies any Bulgarian involvement and wishes that Ireland would close off this line of inquiry publicly. Irish officials, more generally, remain concerned that IRA funds acquired through sophisticated investments are seeping into resources available for Sinn Feinâ€™s political activities in the Republic of Ireland. Post expects that Irish officials will remain reticent on details of the money-laundering investigation until charges are filed. End summary.
Linking the Bank Robbery and Money Seizures
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Â¶2. (C) The roughly STG 3 million seized in Dublin and Cork the week of February 14 (ref B) is â€œbeyond doubtâ€ a portion of the STG 26.5 million stolen from Belfastâ€™s Northern Bank on December 20, 2004, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Department of Justice, Equality, and Law Reform (DOJ)XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX related to Emboff the GOIâ€™s belief that up to 16 individuals questioned by Garda (police) in connection with the seizures were attempting to launder the stolen proceeds on behalf of the Provisional IRA (PIRA). This belief was based on information provided by Garda intelligence assets and by â€œwalk-insâ€ who, in some instances, voluntarily turned over cash that they had been asked to hide (STG 300,000 in one case). While intelligence pointed clearly to a money-laundering operation, the challenge was to build forensic ties between the money seized and the stolen Northern Bank notes in order to support a court conviction. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Garda, led by the Criminal Assets Bureau, were still attempting to establish forensic links through the tracking system used by the Northern Bank for bank note bundles in its possession at the time of December robbery.
Â¶3. (C) If such ties could be established before autumn, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), James Hamilton, would be in a position to bring money-laundering charges by late 2005 against a number of those questioned, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. (To date, no one has been charged, except a XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was charged with membership in the IRA, an illegal organization. XXXXXXXXXXXX Once charges are brought, it would likely take a year to begin the court case. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Hamilton could possibly opt for a special non-jury criminal court consisting of three judges, an option that was sometimes used for cases involving unlawful organizations like the IRA. When Emboff asked who would likely face charges, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that, of those brought in for Garda questioning, no one had been ruled out as beyond suspicion XXXXXXXXXXXX He added that the operative legislation in the case would likely be the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1997, rather than the Criminal Justice Act of 2005, since the latter focused primarily on terrorism.
Â¶4. (C) In separate discussions with the Ambassador, DCM, and Emboffs, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that investigations into the money-laundering case could still take several months, as police used DNA and other scientific techniques to pursue a connection to the Northern Bank raid. He commented that the money-laundering operation had been poorly conducted, due most likely to the unexpected size of the bank haul. Investigators were focused primarily on Ted Cunningham and XXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXX
Â¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
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Â¶7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------
Â¶8. (C) More generally, the DOJ and Garda continue to be concerned that money illegally acquired by the IRA was â€œseepingâ€ into resources available for Sinn Finnâ€™s political activities in the Republic of Ireland, said the DOJXXXXXXXXXXXX. The difficulty lay in documenting the mixing of such funds. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) was similarly concerned that political donations obtained by Sinn Fein in the United States and elsewhere overseas were being spent in the South. (Under a 2002 SIPO ruling, Sinn Fein can accept donations from non-Irish citizens in foreign countries, but only for activities outside the Republic of Ireland, i.e., in Northern Ireland.) He noted that the DOJ would be interested to see whether and how the IRA might address criminality in its expected response to Sinn Fein President Gerry Adamsâ€™ call for an end to republican paramilitarism. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the awaited IRA statement would have no bearing on the money-laundering case or other investigations into possible IRA crimes committed since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
Â¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that IRA money was constantly moving, flowing from diversified sources into wide-ranging investments. While the IRA had been proficient in smuggling, robbery, and racketeering since the 1970s, the Celtic Tiger economic boom of the 1990s had prompted the IRA to diversify into more sophisticated business enterprises. IRA investments now included real estate ventures in Dublin, London, and Spanish resort areas, handled by apparently respectable businessmen. XXXXXXXXXXXX also expressed concern about the commingling of ill-gotten IRA funds with Sinn Feinâ€™s political coffers in the Republic of Ireland. The irony, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, was that Sinn Fein was already raising substantial sums for its political activities in the South through legal avenues. He pointed out, for example, that Sinn Fein conducted at least 60 fund-raisers in the South per week for its electoral war chest.
Comment: GOI Reticence
----------------------
Â¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear to Emboffs that the ongoing investigation into the money-laundering case constrained their ability to provide more information, as the lack of detail in their observations bears out. We expect that GOI officials will remain reticent until charges are actually filed, a step that may also be delayed by continuing investigations into the Northern Bank robbery itself. Garda and DOJ representatives are also likely to continue to be quiet in public and in discussions with us regarding funding of Sinn Fein,s activities in the Republic of Ireland. As a political force in the South, Sinn Fein has limited reach, but is seen as the most well-organized and best-funded party. Competing parties, including the governing Fianna Fail party, are anxious to ensure that Sinn Fein members/supporters abide by Irish law and are subject to public scrutiny when they do not. Both the Garda (traditionally tough on the republican movement writ large, due to its terrorist connections) and political levels of the government will be careful to avoid the public perception that any legal pursuit of Sinn Fein/IRA-tied personalities in the South is politically connected. KENNY

Munnkeyman

14-12-2010, 01:40 PM

Wednesday, 31 May 2006, 16:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000623
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, EI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AHERN TAKES â€œHARD LINEâ€ ON DEADLINE
FOR NORTHERN EXECUTIVE
REF: DUBLIN 562
DUBLIN 00000623 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Â¶1. (C) Summary: The Irish Government would not agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Assembly to form an Executive, due to the likely distractions of the mid-2007 Irish general elections, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that fleshing out details for the Northern parties on a post-November fallback plan (â€œPlan Bâ€) would distract their attention from the deadline. (Comment: Whether or not the Irish and British Governments stick to the November 24 deadline, Ahern,s strong remarks are a clear signal to the parties, which the GOI would like the USG to reinforce in discussions with Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).) Ahern believed that Sinn Fein would not endorse joint policing except with the formation of the Executive, though he and Reiss concurred that there had been recent republican progress in interaction with the police. Ahern also expressed disappointment with the DUP,s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, and Reiss noted that DUP leader Ian Paisley was likely to ignore the November deadline in public defiance of the Irish and British Governments. In a separate discussion, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern told Reiss that a single, Southern-hosted investment conference on the North would be preferable to two separate conferences (a view that Northern Secretary Peter Hain accepted in a May 24 phone call with Reiss). In another meeting, Justice Minister Micheal McDowell briefed Reiss and the Ambassador on pending Northern-related legal casesXXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.
The November 24 Deadline and Plan B
-----------------------------------
Â¶2. (C) Under no circumstances would the Irish Government agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Ireland Assembly to form an Executive, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. Ahern explained that, if the deadline were not met, â€œPlan Bâ€ (indefinite suspension of the Assembly and joint UK/Irish stewardship of the Northern political process) would take effect, as the campaign for the expected May 2007 Irish general elections would preclude his continued involvement in Northern negotiations. He added that he had been clear with the British Government on this point and that any effort to establish an Executive after November 24 would fall to the parties. Ahern said he would not be surprised, however, if the parties were to press for a delay beyond the deadline, notwithstanding the long lead-up to November. (Comment: Were the Irish and British Governments to hold the line on the November 24 deadline, they would be showing atypical resolve. We suspect that the decision whether or not to extend the deadline will be taken closer to the date.)
Â¶3. (C) While Plan B would help force the parties, feet to the fire, fleshing out Plan B in more detail now would distract the parties from the November 24 deadline, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, who also attended the meeting with Ahern and Reiss. In any case, Plan B has not been drafted, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX. He expressed hope that the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) report due in early October would show enough republican progress on criminality to catalyze the negotiations, keeping the focus off Plan B. He added that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) risked a huge tactical error in believing that a deal might be achievable after November 24, since Sinn Fein might abandon the negotiation process completely after that deadline.
The DUPâ€™s Refusal to Engage
---------------------------
Â¶4. (C) Ahern expressed disappointment with the DUPâ€™s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, particularly â€œchildishâ€ tactics at the Northern Assembly Stormont Buildings like ducking out of elevators carrying Sinn Fein members. He pointed out that there had been over 30 instances of quiet contact between the DUP and Sinn Fein during the December 2004 negotiations. Since the collapse of those talks and the subsequent Northern Bank robbery and McCartney murder, engagement had ceased. Ahern cited Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adamsâ€™ view that the IRAâ€™s July 2005 decision to decommission weapons should have merited renewed contact with the DUP at some level, not
DUBLIN 00000623 002.2 OF 003
necessarily with DUP leader Ian Paisley. DUP resistance to engagement, he added, was leading the republican community to question Adamsâ€™ overall strategy for the peace process. Ahern admitted that he did not know what would make the DUP speak with Sinn Fein, and he hoped that the Northern Assemblyâ€™s proposed Restoration Committee might be a vehicle for interaction. (At roughly the same time as Special Envoy Reissâ€™ meeting with Ahern, Paisley announced that the DUP would not take part in the Committee as a mechanism for negotiations.)
Policing and Sinn Fein
----------------------
Â¶5. (C) The Northern policing issue would not be resolved until the formation of the Executive, said Ahern. He elaborated that Sinn Fein tacticians would not want to â€œhand over their last cardâ€ with a commitment to joint policing before November, since the DUP would then discount that card in the negotiations. Ahern doubted that the DUP even wanted the devolution of policing at this point. He added that there was therefore little sense in making Sinn Fein endorsement for joint policing a precondition in the Northern negotiations. He added, however, that the republican community was increasingly amenable to such an endorsement.
2006: Good Progress and Next Steps
----------------------------------
Â¶6. (C) On the whole, 2006 has been a very positive year, particularly in terms of progress in the republican community, Ahern observed. He noted that there was increasing engagement on the ground between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and republican areas of Belfast. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that the Irish and British Governments were pleasantly surprised by the publicâ€™s and partiesâ€™ reactions to the April 6 statement that the Assembly would reconvene. The only negative republican occurrences during the year, said Ahern, had been the April 4 murder of Denis Donaldson (the former IRA official who was out-ed as a British informant), the robbery of a liquor truck by alleged IRA members, and the discovery of a 250 lb. fertilizer bomb in Lurgan. Ahern maintained that these incidents were the work of IRA breakaway groups who were not connected with Sinn Fein leadership. He added that Sinn Fein seemed surprised and shaken by the Donaldson murder and, ironically, had supported the April 6 statement calling for reestablishment of Stormont even more strongly as a result.
Â¶7. (C) In terms of next steps, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that Prime Ministers Ahern and Blair planned to meet with all parties on June 26. In the expectation that there would be no progress by that point, the goal of the late June consultations would be to map out the agenda for the period remaining before late November. The Governments, added XXXXXXXXXXXX, would then â€œbed down for the summer.â€ He explained that the Irish Government would continue to listen carefully to the partiesâ€™ rhetoric in order to gauge their seriousness about making the Good Friday Agreement work.
Reiss: No Urgency among Parties
-------------------------------
Â¶8. (C) In his discussion with the Taoiseach (and in separate meetings, per paras below), Special Envoy Reiss reported from his May 19 discussions at Stormont that he sensed no urgency among the parties, particularly the DUP, to commence work on an Executive deal. He noted that DUP was likely to ignore the November 24 deadline in public defiance of the British and Irish Governments. The DUP also appeared confident that it could achieve in the first few months after November any deal that was achievable by November 24. Reiss elaborated that DUP leaders indicated no intention of engaging Sinn Fein, partly out of fear that negotiations with Gerry Adams would see the unionist community â€œlose its shirt.â€
Â¶9. (C) Sinn Fein leaders, by contrast, were relaxed in their discussions with Reiss, with Gerry Adams focused on USG permission for fund-raising activities in the United States in the fall. Reiss believed that Adams was prepared to endorse joint policing, not only to avoid blame if the November 24 deadline passed, but also to project a positive political image for Sinn Fein in the Southâ€™s 2007 general elections. Adams also suggested that a Sinn Fein Executive Council decision, rather than a full party conference, might be sufficient to endorse policing. Reiss agreed with the Taoiseach that there had been progress in the republican community, as was evident from friendly interaction with the PSNI that would have been impossible six months ago.
DUBLIN 00000623 003.2 OF 003
FM Ahern Opposes Proposals for Two Investment Conferences
--------------------------------------------- ------------
Â¶10. (C) In a separate discussion that reviewed most of the issues raised in the Taoiseachâ€™s meeting, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern said that there was no point in having two Northern Ireland investment conferences in the fall that would be sponsored by the North and South, respectively. He remarked that whereas plans for the proposed Northern-sponsored conference lacked focus and details, the Southâ€™s conference would work and would proceed regardless. Reiss agreed that a single conference would be better, and he asked for the opportunity to speak first to the British Government about this preference. (Comment: On May 24, Reiss discussed the conference proposal with Northern Secretary Peter Hain, who agreed to put off the Northern-sponsored conference until 2007.)
DOJ Update on Legal Cases
-------------------------
Â¶11. (C) Special Envoy Reiss and the Ambassador also met with Minister of Justice and Equality Michael McDowell. Irish Department of Justice (DOJ)officialsXXXXXXXXXXXX who made the following points about Northern Ireland-related legal cases:
XXXXXXXXXXXX
B) Money Launderers. Before November, the Irish Government would bring charges against several individuals connected to the police seizure of several million pound sterling in February 2005, believed to be from the 2004 Northern Bank robbery.XXXXXXXXXXXX
E) Denis Donaldson. McDowell believed that the out-ing of Denis Donaldson as an informant was a clear message from the British Government that it had another, more valuable, source of information within the republican leadership. He reiterated the Taoiseachâ€™s point, however, that Sinn Fein leaders appeared to have had no connection to Donaldsonâ€™s murder. KENNY

C. Flower

01-06-2011, 10:35 AM

Day one of the Indo Wikileaks US State Department cables.

https://irishindoleaks.wordpress.com/

The Indo has been highly selective in what it published.

If anyone has access to any other Irish cables, please pm me a link and I'll add them here.

C. Flower

01-08-2011, 08:31 PM

A good crop of Irish leaks here

http://www.cablegatesearch.net/search.php

C. Flower

27-08-2011, 01:16 PM

http://t.co/o2n88ki

WIKILEAKS RELEASE: 493 Ireland-US embassy cables! wikileaks.org/tag/EI_0.html

Spectabilis

27-08-2011, 01:32 PM

There seem to be no entries beyond page 8 on your link. Would you mind posting the link again?

C. Flower

27-08-2011, 02:00 PM

There seem to be no entries beyond page 8 on your link. Would you mind posting the link again?

That seems to be it.

PaddyJoe

28-08-2011, 12:31 AM

Very innocuous so far. What happened to all the spicy stuff?

MediaBite

06-09-2012, 11:12 AM

Harry Browne wrote a terrific article about the Irish cables last year. Found it yesterday for the first time. It deserves wider notice than it has had so far. I can put the whole thing here as it was published 'copy left'

Ireland’s foreign-affairs minister assured the US ambassador in Dublin in 2006 that the Irish government was prepared to change the law that had allowed the acquittal of five anti-war activists for damaging a US Navy plane.

The revelation that a senior Irish official discussed possible amendments to domestic criminal law with the US ambassador is contained in a Wikileaks cable (see below) that has not been published or reported upon elsewhere, but which has been seen by Counterpunch.

At the time of the acquittal of the so-called Shannon Five, or Pitstop Ploughshares, in July 2006, the US embassy made a public statement expressing its disquiet about the verdict. The then foreign minister, Dermot Ahern, responded with what was seen as a firm public statement of his own, underlining the independence of the judicial system and stating that its verdicts were not a matter for discussion by government officials or between governments.

The cable reveals, however, that a few months later Ahern privately told US officials that the “the Irish Government Cabinet” had been greatly disturbed by the unanimous jury verdict. (The delay between the verdict and this meeting may have been caused by a change-over in US ambassadors.) Ahern told the Americans that the Cabinet had asked the justice minister, Michael McDowell, to examine how the Criminal Damage Act might be amended to close the “legal loophole” that allowed the Shannon Five to be acquitted, so that such a verdict could not happen again. A previously released cable from the same period quotes a senior foreign-affairs bureaucrat telling the Americans the verdict was “bizarre”.

The five, members of the Dublin Catholic Worker, were acquitted after a trial in which their lawyers relied on the statute’s defense of “lawful excuse” for defendants who damage property in the honest belief that doing so will protect life or property, as long as that belief is reasonable in the circumstances. The law does not explicitly require that the threat to life or property be “immediate”.

Justice minister McDowell, a notorious right-wing ideologue, lost his parliamentary seat and thus his government post in the election of May 2007, six months after Ahern told US officials McDowell would be seeking to change the law, which has remained unamended.

These November 2006 discussions of the legalities of the Shannon case are the latest in a series of Wikileaks revelations – some published last autumn, others being reported in Irish print and broadcast media this week – that show Irish officials at pains to help the US in its use of Shannon Airport for military purposes and, perhaps, CIA “extraordinary rendition” flights. Irish bureaucrats even asked US officials for their legal advice about why American planes at Shannon should not be inspected by police here, and said that such advice would be a guide for Irish policy.

Cables sent from the US embassy over a period of years show Irish officials specifically turning a blind eye to the possibility that rendition flights were landing in the west of this neutral country. Senior Irish politicians appear to have relied on vague assurances from US officials but repeatedly expressed concerns that they would be caught lying to the Irish parliament and people if a rendition flight were discovered at Shannon. In December 2004 Taoiseach (prime minister) Bertie Ahern (no relation to Dermot) told the US ambassador that he had been saying publicly that there were no such flights, and pleaded: “Am I all right on this?”

American and Irish officials freely acknowledged that the US use of Shannon as a stopover for troops and military equipment was unpopular with the Irish public, especially when the issue of renditions arose, but discussed ways that they could cooperate on managing media and public relations. After the Green Party joined Ireland’s governing coalition in 2007, it insisted on the setting up of a Cabinet sub-committee on human-rights issues, including those raised by Shannon. A US embassy cable correctly identified the subcommittee as a “sop” to the Greens that would cause no trouble to the Americans.

Like many of the cables from around the world, the Dublin cables so far revealed through Wikileaks show US diplomats effectively united with their local counterparts against a common enemy: the people – whether the people take the form of anti-war activists, jurors or voters in an upcoming election. Cables consistently praise the Irish government for its efforts “in the face of public criticism” on behalf of the US in Shannon, described by ambassador James Kenny in 2004 as “a key transit point for U.S. troops and materiel bound for theatres in the war on terror”.

A cable written by Kenny in 2006 and published by Wikileaks late last year admits that ”the airport [is] a symbol of Irish complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in the Gulf/Middle East” and that “popular sentiment was manifest in the July 25 jury decision to acquit the ‘Shannon Five,’ a group of anti-war protesters who damaged a U.S. naval aircraft at the airport in 2003.”

Some of the Wikileaks revelations have received prominent coverage in Ireland, notably in the Irish Independent and Belfast Telegraph newspapers, which have partnered with Wikileaks for a series of well displayed and heavily advertised stories this week. However, neither the newspapers nor state broadcaster RTE, which obtained several Shannon-related cables and reported on them on Thursday evening, have been publishing the cables, merely reporting on extracts, and not always even including the reports on their websites.

Wikileaks typically itself publishes cables on its own website once they have been reported upon and redacted by its media partners, but at the time of writing only 18 Dublin cables have appeared on the Wikileaks site this week, perhaps delayed because of the newspapers’ print-only policy with many of the stories. I calculate, conservatively, that at least 30 different Dublin cables have been quoted so far this week, but the number is uncertain because they have often been used without specific dates being cited. Neither the print nor broadcast journalists have seen fit to report on the cable discussed above, though I understand both RTE and the Irish Independent have it in their possession.

The Wikileaks revelations over the last year or so – from the Iraq and Afghan war logs to the diplomatic cables – have revealed a great deal about the operations of governments. They have also revealed some of the profound failings of the mainstream media, which, when they are not denouncing Julian Assange and ignoring Bradley Manning, can be found squabbling over the “exclusives” that those men’s efforts have apparently brought us. There is a long way to go, in Ireland and elsewhere, before this information is truly free.

Harry Browne lectures in journalism at Dublin Institute of Technology. He is the author of HammeredBytheIrish, a book about the Shannon Five case, published by CounterPunch / AK Press. Contact harry.browne@gmail.com

The Dublin Cables.

The associated cables are in the next post

MediaBite

06-09-2012, 11:13 AM

Cables accompanying Harry Browne's article above:

id:84237
date:2006-11-03T12:58:00
source:Embassy Dublin
origin:06DUBLIN1284
destination:VZCZCXRO8822 RR RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDL #1284/01 3071258 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031258Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7654 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0476 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
classification:CONFIDENTIAL
reference:06DUBLIN1020

▶C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 001284

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, PREF…
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 001284

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, PREF, EI
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSS
SHANNON, NORTHERN IRELAND

REF: A. DUBLIN 1020

B. DUBLIN 1172
C. STATE 172627

DUBLIN 00001284 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Jonathan Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).

1. (C) Summary. In a November 1 discussion, the Ambassador
and Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern did a tour d'horizon of key
bilateral issues. Ahern:

-- urged bilateral cooperation to avoid "surprises" regarding
U.S. military use of Shannon Airport;

-- noted that the Irish Cabinet had charged the Justice
Minister to review legal loopholes used by the Shannon Five
to avoid prosecution for damaging a U.S. naval plane in 2003;

-- said that he did not expect the Northern Ireland Assembly
to meet the November 24 deadline for nominating an Executive,
due to the impasse on oath/policing issues;

-- expressed disappointment with the failure of Northern
Ireland parties to engage directly on follow-through for the
St. Andrews Agreement; and,

-- observed that the Irish Government would continue to lobby
the USG to regularize the status of undocumented Irish
citizens resident in the United States.

2. (C) The Ambassador:

-- noted appreciation for U.S. military use of Shannon and
offered the USG's best efforts to avoid missteps;

-- emphasized the goal of preventing future actions by Irish
protestors to disrupt U.S. operations at Shannon;

-- underscored continued USG support for the Northern Ireland
peace process;

-- expressed gratitude for the scheduled November 9
extradition of U.S. citizen Frederick Russell, but cautioned
that failure to act on other extradition requests could give
Ireland the image of a criminal haven; and,

-- observed that movement on Irish concerns about
undocumented citizens in the United States would be
difficult. End summary.

Shannon
-------

3. (C) In a November 1 introductory discussion with the
Ambassador, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern urged bilateral
cooperation to avoid "surprises" regarding U.S. military use
of Shannon Airport. Ahern recalled that the Irish Parliament
had required him to explain previous U.S. pre-notification
failures on Shannon transits involving weapons and U.S.
military prisoners. He was also scheduled to address the
European Parliament shortly on allegations that Ireland has
assisted in extraordinary rendition flights, which he planned
to rebuff on the basis of previous USG assurances on the
issue. Ahern conceded that the Irish Government was partly
to blame for missteps at Shannon, as the Department of
Transport had not previously sought full information on the
materiel/passengers in transit -- a shortcoming that Ireland
aimed to correct in the context of global terrorist threats.
The Ambassador expressed appreciation for U.S. military use
of Shannon, and he offered the USG's best efforts to avoid
missteps and to coordinate on any necessary media strategy.
Ahern noted that the Embassy's public outreach to explain the
June transit of a Marine prisoner had helped to diffuse
public criticism over the event.

4. (C) The Irish court decision to acquit five persons who
had damaged a U.S. naval plane at Shannon Airport in 2003
(the so-called "Shannon Five") had seriously disturbed the
Irish Government Cabinet, Ahern said (ref A). He explained
that while there were no means to overturn the jury decision,
the Cabinet had requested Minster for Justice Michael
McDowell to examine ways to close off legal loopholes
exploited by defense lawyers (who argued that the defendants
had sought to prevent loss of life in Iraq). The Ambassador
emphasized the goal of preventing future actions by Irish
citizens to disrupt U.S. military operations at Shannon.
Ahern replied that airport security had been upgraded
following the Shannon Five verdict and that the protest
movement appeared to be losing steam, as evident is a
sparsely attended October 28 rally at Shannon.

DUBLIN 00001284 002.2 OF 003

Northern Ireland
----------------

5. (C) Ahern said that he was "reasonably hopeful" about the
prospects for follow-through on the St. Andrews Agreement,
but he did not expect the Northern Assembly to meet by the
November 24 deadline to nominate the First Minister and
Deputy First Minister, given the impasse over the Executive
oath on policing. Ahern judged that unionists were
unreasonable to require a Sinn Fein pledge on policing before
the party as a whole had authorized this step. On the other
hand, Sinn Fein had been obstinate in declining to call a
party conference before November 24, observed Ahern. He
added that a further complication in negotiations was
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) reluctance to engage in
face-to-face discussions with Sinn Fein on the policing/oath
hurdle. This reluctance was a regression from late 2004,
when Sinn Fein and the DUP had substantive, direct contact in
pursuit of a devolution deal at that time. The Ambassador
underscored continuing USG willingness to support the peace
process in every possible capacity.

6. (C) The Irish Government had no illusions that progress
on policing as part of the negotiations would be "tortuous,"
Ahern observed. He recounted serious discrimination by the
former Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) against nationalists
across the border from his home county of Louth. He also
took note of remarks by DUP leader Nigel Dodds and others
expressing reluctance to allow "former terrorists" within the
republican community to participate in policing and justice
structures. Ahern pointed out that the ill-fated 2004
agreement had pushed the policing issue off to the future and
that parties remained stalled on this point, although Sinn
Fein had shown progress on policing cooperation over the past
year.

Other Key Issues
-----------------

7. (C) The Ambassador and Ahern also discussed briefly the
following issues:

A. Extradition. The expected November 9 extradition of U.S.
citizen Frederick Russell demonstrated Irish willingness to
work through U.S. extradition requests, said Ahern (ref B).
He observed that the Irish Government was precluded from
lobbying the Irish judiciary on extradition issues, making it
imperative for U.S. federal/state justice officials to
satisfy the courts' requests for thorough, uniform
documentation in such cases. He added that Ireland had been
innately reluctant to transfer criminal suspects to foreign
jurisdictions, particularly in the 1970-80s when republicans
involved in the Northern Ireland Troubles would cross the
border to evade British authorities. The Ambassador
expressed gratitude for Irish action on the Russell case, but
cautioned that failure to act on other extradition requests
could give Ireland the image of a criminal haven.

B. Undocumented Irish. According to Ahern, Irish officials
would continue to press the USG for measures to regularize
the status of up to 50,000 undocumented Irish resident in the
United States, while recognizing that this Irish segment was
part of a larger picture of illegal immigration. He said
that a recent proposal (floated by Irish parliamentarian Tom
Kitt) for a bilateral agreement that would ease mutual
entry/residence restrictions for Irish and U.S. nationals
deserved consideration. The Ambassador noted the
Administration's sensitivity to long-term undocumented U.S.
residents who were contributing to their communities, but he
added that the Congress seemed disinclined at the moment to
consider any form of amnesty.

C. Cuba. Ahern committed to discuss with Deputy Prime
Minister (Tanaiste) and Justice Minister, Michael McDowell,
the USG request for Ireland to resettle roughly 30 Cuban
migrants housed in Guantanamo who were determined by DHS to
have a well founded fear of persecution (ref C). Ahern noted
that Ireland had recently coordinated with UNHCR to accept
ten refugees resident in Malta, who had arrived as part of a
burgeoning flow of African migrants into southern EU Member
States.

D. Lebanon. The Ambassador noted that 150 Irish troops had
arrived in Lebanon on October 30 as part of the expanded
UNIFIL force, and he expressed appreciation for Ireland's
contribution. Ahern replied that Ireland's experience in
UNIFIL and familiarity with local Lebanese communities had
obliged the Government to contribute troops, even though the
Taoiseach initially had opposed deployment in view of Irish

DUBLIN 00001284 003.2 OF 003

commitments to other UN peacekeeping operations.

E. IFI. The Irish Government, said Ahern, would lobby
Congress for continued U.S. support of the International Fund
for Ireland (IFI), which would help to advance the
generation-long process of community reconciliation in
Northern Ireland and Irish border counties. He cited
Ballymena in Northern Ireland as a community riven by
sectarianism, as seen in the recent murder of a Catholic
youth and the reluctance of local unionist politicians to
work with republican counterparts.

Participants
------------

8. (SBU) In addition to Foreign Minister Ahern, Irish
participants included Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
Secretary General Dermot Gallagher and the Minister's Special

SIPDIS
Advisor, Ciaran O Cuinn. On the U.S. side, the DCM and
Pol/Econ Section Chief also took part.
FOLEY
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